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Judicious Imprisonment
Does Current Sentencing for Non-violent Offenses Promote Political Legitimacy?
Gregory Jay Hall
ABSTRACT
Starting August 21, 2018, Americans incarcerated across the United
States have been striking back—non-violently.1 Inmates with jobs are
protesting slave-like wages through worker strikes and sit-ins.2 Inmates
also call for an end to racial disparities and an increase in rehabilitation
programs.3 Even more surprisingly, many inmates have begun hunger
strikes.4 Inmates are protesting the numerous ills of prisons:
overcrowding, inadequate health care, violence, disenfranchisement of
inmates, abysmal mental health care contributing to inmate suicide, and
more.5 While recent reforms have slightly decreased mass incarceration,
the current White House administration could likely reverse this trend.
President Donald Trump’s and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s
statements and policies that call for increased mandatory sentences,
cracking down on illegal immigrants, and aggressively enforcing drug
laws might be the iron fist that breaks the back of an already collapsing
criminal justice system.6 Many, including judges currently sitting on the
bench, believe that numerous unjust laws and their unjust penalties have
brought the United States penal system to this breaking point.7 To those
1

Amani Sawari, Jared Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, Strike Statement
to the Press: Statement Regarding the Ongoing Nationwide Prison Strike, INCARCERATED
WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://incarcerated workers.org/news/
strike-statement-press-august-28-2018.
2
Id.; German Lopez, America’s Prisoners Are Going on Strike in at Least 17 States, VOX (Aug.
22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/17/17664048/national-prison-strike-2018.
3
Id.
4
Id.; Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1.
5
Id.; Lopez, supra note 2.
6
Gaby Galvin, Underfunded, Overcrowded State Prisons Struggle With Reform: It Took a
Correctional Officer’s Death for Delaware’s Legislature to Address its Prison Problem (July 26,
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-07-26/understaffed-and-over
crowded-state-prisons-crippled-by-budget-constraints-bad-leadership.
7
THE ECONOMIST, Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners: Never in
the Civilised World Have So Many Been Locked Up for So Little (July 22, 2010),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/07/22/too-many-laws-too-many-prisoners; see also
Anonymous & Beth Schwartzapfel, My Friend Killed Himself in an Alabama Prison, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/13/my-friendkilled-himself-in-an-alabama-prison?ref=collections.
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Americans outside of prison that think they will never be jailed, Tenth
Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski warns them, “You’re (probably) a
federal criminal.”8 Due to the proliferation of criminal laws, the criminal
“justice” system subjects virtually all Americans to the possibility of
imprisonment for conduct that does not even come close to meriting
imprisonment.9 Amid this chaos, a deep and fundamental question
brews: Can the state justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its
unjust laws? Even if the penalties for breaking unjust laws are life in
prison or death? If not, then society’s stability is threatened. This article
negotiates a middle position. The government is justified in enforcing
unjust laws only if these laws are democratically enacted and are almostjust. How much is almost-just? That depends on the kind of law at issue.
Thus, lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges need to carefully distinguish
crimes that directly affect only oneself, crimes that are violent, crimes
that are primarily monetary-based, regulatory crimes, and others. To
implement reforms, this article proposes new affirmative defenses for
crimes, enhanced prosecutorial discretion, and more robust judicial
review as viable mechanisms to invalidate laws and penalties that are not
almost-just.

Introduction
Starting August 21, 2018, persons incarcerated across the United States
have been striking back—non-violently.10 Inmates with jobs are protesting slavelike wages through worker strikes and sit-ins.11 Even more surprisingly, many
inmates have begun hunger strikes in their crusade.12
The problems inmates face have long been noticed but inadequately
addressed. Regarding mass incarceration, Americans go to jail 10.6 million times
each year, and the majority of individuals in jail have not been convicted.13 In
2011, in Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court decided that
overcrowding in California prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment.14
8

Alex Kozinsky & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF
JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW” 43 (Timothy Lynch ed., Cato Institute 2009).
9
Id.; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7.
10
Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1.
11
Lopez, supra note 2.
12
Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1.
13
Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, THE PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (March 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html. This
statistic counts as separate each time the same person goes to jail in a year.
14
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
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Shockingly, the inmate suicide rate in California has been almost double the
national average, and a lack of access to basic health care has led to an average of
one unnecessary death every week.15 While recent reforms have decreased some
states’ prison populations, jail populations remain relatively unchanged.16
In a 302-page ruling, in 2017, United States District Court Judge Myron
Thompson revealed that, due to chronic, statewide overcrowding and
understaffing, many Alabama prisons are “incredibly dangerous and out of
control.”17 Judge Thompson found that the mental health care provided to inmates
in Alabama was “horrendously inadequate.”18 He exposes how the mental health
system continually fails in the way it screens, treats, and monitors inmates living
with mental illness.19 Judge Thompson also lambastes Alabama Department of
Corrections for its policies and practices regarding, among other things, imposing
disciplinary sanctions on mentally ill prisoners for symptoms of their mental
illness and placing seriously mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement without
adequately considering the impact of solitary confinement on their mental
health.20 Sadly yet expectedly, the inmate suicide rate in Alabama has more than
doubled in the prior two years.21
Nationwide, from 2013 to 2014, the number of suicides among state
prisoners increased by 30%, from 192 to 249 suicides in a year.22 In South
Carolina, the number of inmates killed in the state’s prisons more than doubled in
2017 from what it was in 2016 and quadrupled from 2015.23
Due to all of these worsening trends, the recent non-violent strikes by
persons incarcerated do not come as a surprise. Inmates are also protesting certain
oppressive laws and the social and political problems that are rife in the criminal
justice system. Specifically, their grievances include the following:
1. racist sentencing practices;
2. federal laws that enlarge mass incarceration;
3. disenfranchisement of inmates and released convicts;
15

Galvin, supra note 6.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Correctional Population Declined for the Ninth Consecutive
Year (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus16pr.cfm.
17
Id. at 1193-1200.
18
Anonymous & Schwartzapfel, supra note 7; Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1268 (M.D.
Ala. 2017).
19
Id. at 1267-68.
20
Id. at 1240-42, 1267-68.
21
Id. at 1200.
22
Matthew Clarke, Department of Justice Releases Reports on Prison and Jail Deaths, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS 28 (Jan. 8 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/8/depart
ment-justice-releases-reports-prison-and-jail-deaths.
23
Lopez, supra note 2.
16
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4. recent federal laws that make it more difficult for inmates to
successfully sue prison officials for rights violations; and
5. deficient rehabilitation programs in prisons.24
Even though recent reforms have produced some decrease in mass incarceration,
the current White House administration could likely stop this trend or drive it
backwards. President Donald Trump’s and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s
statements and policies that call for increased mandatory sentences, cracking
down on illegal immigrants, and aggressively enforcing drug laws could be the
iron fist that breaks the back of an already collapsing prison system.25 Many,
including judges currently sitting on the bench, believe that numerous unjust laws
and their unjust penalties have brought the United States penal system to this
breaking point.26
To those Americans outside of prison that think they will never be jailed,
Tenth Circuit Court Judge Alex Kozinski warns them, “You’re (probably) a
federal criminal.”27 Due to the proliferation of criminal laws, the criminal
“justice” system subjects virtually all Americans to the possibility of
imprisonment for conduct that does not even come close to meriting
imprisonment.28 For example, federal agents arrested Mr. Norris, a 65-year-old
importer of orchids for making a false statement to an undercover federal agent.29
That federal crime is punishable by up to five years in prison.30 The agent had
ordered some orchids from Mr. Norris, and a few of the orchids arrived without
the correct paperwork.31 Mr. Norris had communicated, regarding the orchid
shipment, with his Latin American suppliers, who were sometimes sloppy about
the paperwork. So, Mr. Norris was also charged with conspiracy, and with it came
another potential five-year prison sentence.32 Mr. Norris made at most $20,000.00

24

Sawari, Ware, & Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, supra note 1; Lopez, supra
note 2.
25
Galvin, supra note 6.
26
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; Timothy Head & Matt Kibbe, Too Many Laws Means Too
Many Criminals, NATIONAL REVIEW (May 21, 2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/
too-many-laws-means-too-many-criminals; Edwin Meese III, Too Many Laws Turn Innocents into
Criminals, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 26, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/crime-andjustice/commentary/too-many-laws-turn-innocents-criminals; Anonymous & Schwartzapfel, supra
note 7.
27
Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, supra note 8, at 43.
28
Id.; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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per year by importing orchids.33 After legal bills exceeded his means, he
reluctantly pled guilty and was sentenced to 17 months in prison.34
In Virginia, Dr. William Hurwitz, who specialized in pain management,
was sentenced to 25 years in prison for prescribing pills that a few of his patients
resold.35 Contrast this harsh sentence with the Virginia board of medicine’s ruling
that Dr. Hurwitz had acted in good faith.36 Nevertheless, he still served almost
four years in prison.37
As it stands, on the one hand, a bloated menagerie of criminal laws turns
normal Americans into imprisoned felons. On the other hand, the abusive and
exploitative prison system makes prisons horrendously harsh leading inmates to
strike from work, go on hunger strikes, and even commit suicide. Amid this
chaos, a deep and fundamental question brews: Can the state justifiably coerce an
individual to comply with its unjust laws? Even if the penalties are life in prison
or death? If these laws are not enforceable, then society’s stability is threatened.
This article negotiates a middle position. Requiring certain laws to be
completely just before government can justifiably enforce them is utopian.
Instead, the government is justified in enforcing unjust laws only if these laws are
democratically enacted and are almost-just. How much is almost-just? That
depends on the kind of law at issue. Thus, lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges
need to carefully distinguish crimes that directly affect only oneself, crimes that
are violent, crimes that are primarily monetary-based, regulatory crimes, and
others. In the end, the government is not justified in enforcing many of the current
unjust criminal laws and unjust penalties. Some of these laws simply need to be
repealed, perhaps gradually. Others need modification; otherwise, they are
invalid.38
Whether the state may justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its
unjust laws primarily concerns injustice, rather than justice. How much injustice
should we tolerate in a democratic society? An efficient and enlightening way to
tackle these issues is by examining, in detail, John Rawls’s theory of political
legitimacy.39

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
While such laws are still legally valid, the point is that good reasons support changing these
laws or lessening their impact.
39
John Rawls’s theory of legitimacy can be found primarily in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993) and John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 578 (Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
34
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Rawls contends that government is justified in enforcing a law if it is:
1. supported by public reason,
2. democratically enacted, and
3. not-too-unjust.40
The third criterion is key because it places a substantive requirement on a law’s
legitimacy.41 If a law is too-unjust, then state coercion to enforce that law is
invalid. Consequently, as long as the law is passed according to acceptable
democratic procedures based in public reason, then Rawls argues that the state is
justified in coercing individuals to comply with an unjust law provided it is nottoo-unjust.
While Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is attractive, this article contends that
his theory needs to be more stringent. More specifically, a theory of legitimacy
needs greater substantive constraints, especially for laws pertaining to criminal
justice. The increased stringency that this article is advocating is that, in addition
to the other requirements, to be legitimate a law must be almost-just instead of
merely not-too-unjust.
Additionally, a theory of legitimacy for law needs a companion theory of
criminal justice, which forgivably Rawls does not provide. In demonstrating how
a more stringent theory of legitimacy would apply to the extant legal system, this
article focuses on crimes involving certain non-violent conduct that directly
affects only the perpetrator due to the extreme human suffering that has resulted
from such laws. To implement reforms, this article proposes new affirmative
defenses for crimes, enhanced prosecutorial discretion, and more robust judicial
review as viable mechanisms to legally invalidate or lessen the impact of laws and
penalties that are not almost-just.
Section One explicates Rawls’s theory of legitimacy in more detail.42
Section Two highlights aspects of Rawls’s theory of justice that are relevant to the
issue of political legitimacy. Section Three argues for three main claims:
1. State coercion that involves only money is less severe than state
coercion that limits one’s freedom.
2. The more severe the state coercion is the greater the justification for
that coercion needs to be.
3. Hence, most laws that limit liberty require greater justification than
most laws that involve only money (“severity claim”).
40

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 128-29, 223-24.
Id. at 428-29.
42
I follow Rawls in only addressing legitimacy as it pertains to a democratic state. SAMUEL
FREEMAN, RAWLS 324-26 (2007). Other kinds of states may require other theories of legitimacy.
41
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These claims above are premises to argue for three more claims in Section Four.
4. The not-too-unjust criterion may be sufficient to assess the legitimacy
of a criminal law, the violation of which is punishable by only fines
and restitution
5. However, the not-too-unjust criterion is insufficient to assess the
legitimacy of a law, the violation of which is punishable by
incarceration.
6. Hence, a theory of legitimacy needs to be more stringent by requiring
(among other things) that a law, the violation of which is punishable
by incarceration or worse, must be almost-just.43
Analogizing in terms of letter grades, a just law earns an “A” grade. A not-toounjust law earns a “B” grade. An almost-just law earns an “A-” grade. As
advocated here, a law must at least earn an “A-” grade for the law to be valid.
A more stringent theory of legitimacy means that the state is not justified
in enforcing many extant laws and penalties. To make this implication concrete,
Section Five illustrates how implementing a more stringent theory of legitimacy
would invalidate extant laws that criminalize certain non-violent conduct that
directly affects only the perpetrator.
Having completed the main argument, Section Six responds to a possible
worry that making a theory of legitimacy more stringent threatens the stability of
a society because, under such, the state may not justifiably enforce many of its
laws. After dispensing with that concern, the conclusion comments on the impact
of this article’s more stringent theory on the extant legal system.

Section One: Rawls’s Theory of Political Legitimacy
Rawls’s theory of political legitimacy has many parts that address various
purposes.44 The following exposition of his theory of legitimacy addresses only
those aspects that deal directly with the motivating question: Can the state
justifiably coerce an individual to comply with its unjust laws? Specifically, this
section will not address how Rawls’s theory of legitimacy solves problems with
his earlier argument for his theory of justice nor will it address how his theory of
legitimacy provides its own (political) argument for what justice requires through
an overlapping consensus. To state the focus differently, this article explores how
unjust the laws of a society can be and still be legitimate—meaning that the state
can coercively enforce the less-than-just laws. To that extent, instead of justice,
43

Below I will flesh out how these technical terms indicate different requirements. Note that
Rawls’s not-too-unjust requirement may delegitimize a law that limits one’s basic rights.
44
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 324-25, 372.
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this article focuses on the independent (though related) question of political
legitimacy.
In focusing on state coercion of just and less-than-just laws, Rawls seeks a
theory of social cooperation.45 Social cooperation involves “people more or less
voluntarily engaging in activities and social relations according to terms of
cooperation that they accept and regard as more or less fair, and from which
everyone benefits in some manner.”46 Rawls’s point is that a society should be
governed by reason rather than force.47 The whole point of constructing a theory
of legitimacy then is to have a public justification for state action rather than
merely making commands through laws and punishing violators without
expecting those subject to the laws to be able to endorse the laws. State coercion
is still part of a theory of legitimacy because one thing that requires public
justification is the conditions under which state coercion may be used. To that
extent, I am not trying to restructure Rawls’s theory into a modus vivendi as
opposed to a theory of social cooperation that reasonable and rational people
could endorse, although I focus on how to justify coercion of less-than-just laws.
To begin, we must clarify that state coercion should be considered
broadly. State coercion means threatening penalties for violating the law as well
as enforcing those penalties. State coercion also involves forcing a person to do
something, such as when a bailiff physically removes an unruly, noncompliant
person from a courtroom as well as forcing someone to pay a fine by garnishing
her wages (before she receives them). State coercion includes the power to tax
and the power to take away a person’s property. More subtly, the state can coerce
individuals by taking away rights and privileges that they would otherwise have,
such as when prisoners are denied the right to vote. Thus, when I use the concept
of state coercion, I mean it in this broad sense, as I think Rawls does.48
In considering state coercion in this broad sense, we can usefully
distinguish two aspects of coercion. The first aspect is the action that the state
either requires or prohibits, usually through law.49 The second aspect is the
45

I am not misinterpreting Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as a modus vivendi. RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 146-47. For Rawls, a modus vivendi denotes a workable way of
organizing a society—mostly through law and sanction—without basing its laws and sanctions on
any process or reasons that citizens can reasonably accept. Id. at 146-49. Rawls is not after such a
theory; he seeks a theory of social cooperation. Id.
46
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 217; FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at
334.
47
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 143.
48
Note that not every law is coercive in nature. H.L.A. Hart emphasizes that some laws do not
have penalties and some laws bestow benefits and rights. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW,
chapter 3 (1961).
49
I mean the distinction between laws that require action and those that prohibit action to be
merely illustrative of how law affects individuals rather than a fundamental distinction.
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penalty the state enforces against those who refrain from doing the required
conduct (e.g. paying taxes) or those who act in the prohibited way (e.g. rape).
Included in the second aspects are penalties for not complying with the state’s
attempt to enforce other penalties (e.g. a longer prison term for escaping from
prison). Examples of penalties are: fines, community service, performance of
specific actions (like returning stolen property), imprisonment, and even death.50
These two aspects of state coercion are important to keep in mind because they
can be different kinds of coercion. For example, the state can coerce its citizens
by requiring that they pay a tax on their income. The state can coerce the
individual who does not pay the required income tax by fining him or putting him
in prison. Both the income tax and the penalty for its violation are two (separable)
aspects of state coercion.
Rawls intends his theory of legitimacy to apply to both aspects of state
coercion that I have identified: the law and the sanction for its violation.51
However, Rawls does not insist that every law must meet his theory of
legitimacy.52 Instead, Rawls argues that his theory of legitimacy definitely applies
to “constitutional essentials” of the legal system and questions of “basic justice,”
leaving open the application to other areas of law.53 By constitutional essentials,
Rawls means two aspects of the legal system:
a. fundamental principles that specify the general structure of
government and the political process…
b. equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities
are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics,
liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as
the protections of the rule of law.54
I think Rawls would include in constitutional essentials whether the society
protects the rights in the United States Constitution that play a large role in the
criminal justice system such as the right against self-incrimination and the right
against cruel and unusual punishment, although Rawls is unclear on this point.55
Such are plausibly part of a society’s “equal basic rights and liberties of
50

I omit corporal punishment (aside from the death penalty) since democratic states no longer
use it. In terms of my classification, I would consider corporal punishment as part of liberty
coercion because the penalized cannot choose to forego the corporal punishment. Torture is also
liberty coercion.
51
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 182.
52
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 214-15.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 227.
55
Id. at 218 (mentioning some of the constitutional rights pertaining to criminal procedure
without explicitly tying them to what he refers to elsewhere as constitutional essentials). But see
id. at 232.
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citizenship.”56 Below I will argue that we should also include in constitutional
essentials all core parts of criminal justice. For now, Rawls means his theory of
legitimacy to apply at least to constitutional essentials (outlined above) and basic
justice (provided by his theory of justice as fairness).57
For laws involving the constitutional essentials and basic justice to be
legitimate, Rawls believes that laws must meet three criteria. Legitimate laws
must be supported by public reasons; they must be passed through an acceptable
democratic procedure; and they must be not-too-unjust.58 I will explicate each of
these criteria in turn.
First, for a law to be legitimate, Rawls argues that the law must be
supported by a public reason.59 Rawls conceives of public reason as the kinds of
reasons, inferences, and evidence that a society uses to deliberate about its laws.60
Rawls exemplifies what he means by public reason through the way the U.S.
Supreme Court usually defends their decisions.61 The Supreme Court does not
(usually) employ controversial religious, moral, philosophical, or scientific
doctrines in how it usually reasons through its decisions.62 Instead, the Court
(usually) employs reasons including rules of inference and evidence that “all
citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be expected to endorse.”63
The Court’s methodology is essentially what Rawls means by his term public
reason.64
From the example of the Supreme Court, we learn that public reasons
must not be controversial religious, moral, philosophical, or scientific reasons.65 If
reason is a public reason, then it counts (even minimally) in the public
56

Id.
Id. at 228-29.
58
While these ideas are Rawls’s ideas partially filtered through Samuel Freeman’s work,
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, the presentation of them in this way is my creation. I provide
textual support for each requirement below.
59
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 223-24; see also FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra
note 42, at 379.
60
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 212-13, 223-24.
61
Id. at 231-40. The Court does not always exclusively use public reason. FREEMAN, RAWLS at
384. An infamous example is Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell v. State of Illinois,
83 U.S. 130 (1873), where he states, “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....The paramount
destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator.” Id. at 142. Fortunately, at least in recent history, the Supreme Court
does not (usually) employ nonpublic reasons, such as controversial religious, moral, philosophical,
or scientific doctrines, in how it reasons in its decisions.
62
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 236.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 240.
65
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 404-05.
57
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deliberation.66 Even if a public reason is not decisive on whether to enact a law,
most everyone can reasonably acknowledge that the reason counts (even
minimally) for or against a possible law.67
Since public reasons do not include or rely on controversial religious,
moral, philosophical, or scientific beliefs, then virtually all citizens can
reasonably endorse these reasons despite their particular worldview
(‘comprehensive doctrine’ in Rawls’s words).68 Rawls calls this phenomenon
“overlapping consensus.”69 Individuals with different and conflicting religious,
moral, philosophical, and scientific beliefs can come to a consensus about laws
when they only employ public reason since public reason excludes the
controversial beliefs about which individuals disagree.70 Using public reason for
public deliberation fosters social stability because what can cause deep divisions
among citizens (controversial beliefs) is excluded from the discussion about the
law.71 By excluding controversial beliefs from the law making process, Rawls
thinks that a democracy can be stable for the right reasons over time because
everyone can reasonably affirm the reasons supporting the laws.72 While the
concept of public reason itself has more to it than I have stated, for brevity’s sake,
I turn to how public reason applies to the issue of legitimacy,
Rawls contends that a law cannot be legitimate unless supported by public
reasons.73 For example, the state cannot require that all individuals serve in the
military for the reason that doing so helps individuals draw closer to God. The
reason “serving in the military draws one closer to God” contains several
controversial religious and philosophical beliefs. Instead, the state may be able to
require that all individuals serve in the military (for a period) for the reason that
universal military service would strengthen the country’s ability to defend itself in
times of war and emergency. Not everyone would agree that a law requiring
universal military service was a good idea. However, virtually everyone could
reasonably endorse that the reason behind the law— universal military service
would strengthen the country’s ability to defend itself in times of war and
emergency—counts (even minimally) in favor of the law. This reason along with
the implicit idea that strengthening the country’s defense is a reasonably good
goal to pursue are public reasons that could be used to support a law requiring
universal military service. To the extent that a law is supported by one or more
66

Id. at 405-06.
As evident in Freeman’s discussion of abortion and public reason. Id. at 406-09.
68
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 226.
69
Id. at 150.
70
Id. at 152.
71
Id.
72
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 390-93.
73
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 217.
67
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public reasons, the law has met Rawls’s first criterion in his theory of
legitimacy.74
Not every possible law supported by public reasons should become a law;
some possible laws are better than others. Instead of assessing the strength of
public reasons directly, Rawls relies on a democratic procedure (the second
requirement) to choose among the possible laws supported by public reasons.75
“Democratic decisions and laws are legitimate, not because they are just but
because they are legitimately enacted in accordance with an accepted legitimate
democratic procedure.”76 Without democratic endorsement, the law is not
legitimate.
Rawls is not too specific on what democratic endorsement involves,
though he requires that it be a procedure that “all may reasonably accept as free
and equal when collective decisions must be made and agreement is normally
lacking.”77 He imagines a process where the society debates the merits of laws
through “critical and informed deliberation among equals.”78 Such a deliberation
only allows public reasons to count for or against a law.79 The process allows
voting in some way based on what individuals think is the best law based only on
the relevant public reasons.80 While Rawls envisions citizens voting (at least for
representatives), Rawls does not require a participatory democracy—where every
citizen actively participates in the law making process. 81 Since I do not intend to
take issue with this democratic requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, I will
let the brief remarks I have made suffice.
Finally, the third requirement for a law to be just in Rawls’s theory is a
substantive requirement, which I refer to as the “not-too-unjust requirement.”82

74

Due to Rawls’s unclarity, when I say “one or more,” I am interpreting Rawls to some extent.
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 403.
76
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428. Deliberative democratic endorsement
is a requirement of a legitimate law, in part, because deliberative democracy is essential to public
reason. FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 404.
77
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428.
78
Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 371, 398-99 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Deliberative Democracy].
79
Id.
80
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 216-20. I omit a discussion of the duty of
civility because it seems to point us to the requirements of public discussion about laws. While
important, I am focusing instead on how laws that have been passed impact individuals punished
for violating those laws. For clarity, I keep the ideas separate.
81
Freeman, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 78, at 378-79.
82
I call it “substantive” (as Rawls does in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428-29) to
distinguish it from the other two requirements of legitimacy even though Rawls’s theory of justice
as fairness is itself a procedural theory of justice.
75
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Rawls requires, “laws cannot be too unjust if they are to be legitimate.83 Rawls
does not provide much more content to this vague requirement except to say that
“laws that clearly violate the basic liberties are then neither just nor legitimate,
and should have no legal or political authority.”84 Freeman characterizes the nottoo-unjust requirement in terms of the laws needing to be “moderately” just.85
Making this substantive requirement specific enough to apply to actual
laws necessitates that I interpret (to some extent) Rawls’s vague not-too-unjust
requirement, given other aspects of Rawlsianism. Since I am arguing that this
substantive requirement needs to be more stringent, much of what I will argue
below attempts to make the substantive requirement more specific. I do so by
trying to draw some brighter lines about what would constitute a law being nottoo-unjust.86 Despite vagueness, the general idea Rawls has in mind should be
understandable.
The role the third requirement plays in relation to the other two
requirements is important. The requirements of public reason and democratic
endorsement do not assess the substance of the law directly. In Rawls’s words,
“the outcomes of a legitimate procedure are legitimate whatever they are. This
gives us purely procedural democratic legitimacy and distinguishes it from
justice.”87 Specifically, the public reason requirement pertains to the kinds of
reasons offered without assessing their merit. The democratic endorsement
requirement relies on a procedure to produce substantively good laws. Only the
not-too-unjust requirement assesses directly the substance of the laws
themselves.88 Due to its function, I often refer to this requirement as the
“substantive requirement.” Since I am concerned about the substantive injustice
that can result even when the public reason and the democratic endorsement
requirements are satisfied, I focus mainly on making the substantive requirement
more stringent.
Recall, the purpose of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy that I am focusing on
is to tell us when state coercion is justified to enforce laws, even when the laws
83

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 429. The requirement is not only vague but
is also “undetermined.” Id. at 428. “Legitimacy allows an undetermined range of injustice that
justice might not permit.” Id.
84
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 376. One qualification to this point is that, at places,
Rawls allows basic liberties to be limited in order to strengthen the overall protection of basic
liberties.
85
Id. at 377.
86
I do not pretend to give the range of injustice permitted by legitimacy; I draw some
meaningful lines.
87
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428.
88
“Neither the procedures nor the laws need be just by a strict standard of justice, even if, what
is also true, they cannot be too gravely unjust. At some point, the injustice of the outcomes of a
legitimate democratic procedure corrupts its legitimacy.” Id.
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are less-than-just. Rawls also has two related goals that focus on how citizens
regard the law. First, Rawls aims to provide with his theory of legitimacy reasons
why citizens should have general respect for political authority.89 Closely related,
the second goal is to show that citizens (and those within the ambit of the society)
have a duty to obey the law.90 These two goals relate to the main purpose (I focus
on) of the justifiability of state coercion in the following way. If laws are
legitimate according to Rawls’s theory, then individuals in that state have a duty
to respect and obey the laws and the state is justified in coercing individuals to
obey the laws, including punishing those who violate the law.
The two goals of general respect and the duty to obey suggest that Rawls
is trying to justify a general obligation to obey the law.91 The alternative would be
to provide a theory that would examine whether each individual has a duty to
obey each particular law. This alternative kind of theory directs us to assess the
obligation to obey a law each individual at a time, assessing each law one-byone.92 I think that Rawls is not doing either of these options in his theory of
legitimacy despite the appearance that he wants to justify a general duty to obey
all laws. Instead, he is doing something in between these two options. Although I
have not space for a full defense of my interpretation of Rawls on this point, I
think what Rawls aims to do is provide us with a theory that can be applied to
particular laws to assess their legitimacy. The assessment is not specific to
individuals like the alternative extreme above; if a law is legitimate, it is
legitimate as far as everyone in the society is concerned. At the same time, Rawls
seems to hope that his theory will show that enough of the laws in most
democracies are legitimate such that individuals in these societies will have
general respect for political authority. Furthermore, if Rawls’s theory shows that
most laws are legitimate, then the general perspective or the prima facie position
that individuals should take is that they have a duty to obey the law. This prima
facie duty to obey the law is defeasible, but defeasing it requires persuasive
argument. To that extent, Rawls thinks his theory of legitimacy provides a duty to
obey the law where exceptions may occur but would be rare.93
Rawls concerns himself with general respect for political authority and the
duty to obey the law along with the justifiability of state coercion because he is
89

In part because the law-making process affirms their political autonomy. FREEMAN, RAWLS,
supra note 42, at 400-01.
90
Id. at 377.
91
Rawls advocates a general obligation to obey law based on the duty of fair play. John Rawls,
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM (S. Hook ed.,
New York Univ. Press 1964). See also A. John Simmons, The Duty of Fair Play, 8 PHIL. AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 307 (1979).
92
Joseph Raz offers such an individualist theory of the duty of obey the law (a theory of
“political authority” in Raz’s terms). JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
93
Rawls suggests such in RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 393.
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worried about social stability.94 Rawls thinks that a theory of justice is not an
adequate theory unless it can provide for social cooperation that is stable (for the
right reasons) over time.95 Since any society is bound to have some laws that are
unjust due to the difficulty of democratic political processes and the imperfect
abilities of humans (‘“imperfect procedural justice”’), Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy helps show how a society can be stable over time even with less-thanjust laws.96
Without social stability, a society with less-than-just but legitimate laws
cannot incrementally improve its laws to achieve greater justice. Without stability,
the democratic processes that can improve laws may be disrupted and any social
discord may stunt the society’s progress toward justice. Even worse, if societies
with less-than-just but legitimate laws cannot maintain stability, they may lose the
degree of justice that they have obtained falling into greater injustice or social
chaos. To justify avoiding greater injustice, the ultimate aim of Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy is to show that a less-than-just but legitimate society is justified in
using state coercion to maintain stability and that citizens have a duty to obey the
less-than-just and the just laws to foster stability.
As I mentioned above, the main worries about my argument for increased
stringency in standards for legal legitimacy is that such undercuts social stability.
While I argue that this worry has little force, I now prepare for my argument by
highlighting how Rawls’s theory of legitimacy relates to aspects of his theory of
justice as fairness.

Section Two: Highlighting Rawls’s Ideal Theory of Justice
To prepare for my argument, I must highlight a couple aspects of Rawls’s
theory of justice as fairness.97 Rawls’s theory of justice is important because
Rawls develops his theory of legitimacy in contrast to his theory of justice.98
Thus, to understand fully his theory of legitimacy we must understand certain
aspects of his theory of justice.
The first important point to highlight is that Rawls’s develops his theory of
justice within a theoretical construct that Rawls calls “ideal theory.”99 (When I am
referring to Rawls’s theory of justice, I mean primarily those aspects that justify
94

FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 410.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 38, 140-43, 391.
96
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 377.
97
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 18-19 (1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE
AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
98
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 428.
99
Or, “strict compliance theory.” RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note
97, at 8-9.
95
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and explain his two principles of justice. I am not referring to the stages in his
theory where the assumptions of ideal theory are relaxed.) Ideal theory makes
particular simplifying assumptions. One important simplifying assumption that
Rawls makes in his theory of justice is that he assumes that “everyone is
presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”100 To that
extent, ideal assumes that individuals generally comply with the laws. 101 For this
reason, Rawls calls ideal theory “strict compliance theory.”102
Rawls sees strict compliance as an important assumption to make in
constructing a theory of justice. A reason why strict compliance is important to
Rawls is that he wants to construct a theory of justice that is grounded in the legal
apparatus of a society.103 So, assuming that all people will obey the laws is
tantamount to assuming that people will follow his theory of justice. Rawls wants
to assume that people will follow his theory of justice because he thinks that how
we should deal with partial-compliance depends on the theory of justice we
endorse assuming strict-compliance.104
My aim is not to fully explicate, defend, or critique Rawls’s use of strict
compliance theory. Instead, I am pointing out this feature of Rawls’s theory of
justice to show how it should relate to Rawls’s theory of legitimacy.
From Rawls’s use of ideal theory including his assumption of strict
compliance with the law, we can notice the second aspect of Rawls’s theory of
justice. Rawls’s theory of justice does not include a complete theory of criminal
justice.105 By a theory of criminal justice, I mean to include a theory of criminal
procedural rights (What procedures must the state follow in enforcing criminal
and regulatory laws?), a theory of criminalization (What should be criminalized?),
and a theory of punishment (How and how much criminal acts should be
punished?). Other areas of laws are also left out by Rawls’s assumption of strict
compliance such as regulatory law, which at present in the U.S. straddles criminal
law and administrative law.106 While Rawls’s assumption of strict compliance
occludes other important areas of law (e.g. tort law), I focus on the four areas I
have mentioned: criminal procedural rights, criminalization, punishment, and
regulation. These four areas of law (that Rawls leaves out) deal with how society
100

Id. at 8.
Id. at 245.
102
Id. at 8, 245.
103
Id. at 7. The “basic structure” is essentially what I am referring to here without the Rawlsian
jargon.
104
Id. at 9; see also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 143-44, 284-85.
105
Rawls is aware of this lack. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97,
at 8-9, 575. Perhaps, a partial theory of penalties exists even in ideal theory, but Rawls does not
provide it for us. Id. at 241.
106
Such is implicit in Id. at 241. Again, a partial theory (not given by Rawls) may be required
for ideal theory.
101
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should treat those who do not comply with the law. In sum, since Rawls assumes
strict compliance with the law, his theory of justice as fairness does not address
how to deal with instances where individuals do not comply with the law.
Rawls intentionally omits the theories that I am highlighting.107 I am not
criticizing Rawls’s theory of justice for its use of ideal theory, its assumption of
strict compliance, or its omission of theories of criminal justice and regulatory
law. However, once we leave Rawls’s theory of justice and move to his theory of
legitimacy, we also need to leave the realm of ideal theory, abandoning the
assumption of strict compliance.108
The reason why we need to abandon ideal theory is that a theory of
legitimacy is a question most relevant in non-ideal theory. The essence of the
question of legitimacy is as follows: how far can we depart from justice with state
coercion still being justified? Since the society does not achieve complete justice
in its laws, something along the way has gone wrong, as it seems that it inevitably
must go wrong in actual human practices.109
An objector may argue that while working out a theory of legitimacy, we
could still maintain the assumption of strict compliance. All individuals could still
be assumed to obey both just and unjust-but-still-legitimate laws. Thus, even
though we are allowing something to go wrong such that full justice is not achieve
in the laws, we can still assume strict compliance with the laws.
In response, perhaps we could work out a partial theory of legitimacy with
the assumption of strict compliance. However, we cannot work out a full theory
of legitimacy without eliminating the assumption of strict compliance. As long as
we assume strict compliance, the need for the criminal law is not fully
appreciated. In particular, a theory of criminal procedural rights would be largely
undeveloped under strict compliance because the procedure would not be used.
Thus, to have a complete theory of legitimacy for the real world, we need to
construct a theory of legitimacy outside of ideal theory—where the assumption of
strict compliance is abandoned.110
Another aspect of Rawls’s theory of justice that is important to my
argument is the priority relationship between his principles of justice. Instead of
addressing this issue here, I will highlight it below where it figures into the
argument. To begin that argument, I now turn to the role stability plays in Rawls’s
theory of legitimacy.

107

Id. at 8-9, 575.
FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 324-25, 379.
109
Id. at 377.
110
Id. at 324-25, 379.
108
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Section Three: More Severe State Coercion Requires Greater
Justification
Recall that Rawls is interested in constructing a theory of legitimacy for
state coercion because he is concerned about the stability of the government and
the society over time. While a just society is preferable to an unjust society, Rawls
does not want a society to be unstable if its laws do not completely meet Rawls’s
standard of justice. Rawls seems resigned to the possibility that no society can be
completely just.111 Rawls does not want the lack of justice in a society to lead to
instability, law-breaking, and/or revolution, at least as long as the lack of justice is
not that much.
To avoid instability, law-breaking, and/or revolution, the state often
employs coercion. State coercion (including credible threats) can incentivize
individuals to comply with the law.112 Thus, through coercion, a state can
maintain stability. For Rawls, the state’s use of coercion must be justifiable.
Rawls believes that coercion is justifiable to uphold just laws and just institutions.
However, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is aimed at showing when coercion is
justifiable to uphold laws that are less-than-just.
One reason Rawls needs a theory of legitimacy is due to the publicity
requirement of his theory of justice. Rawls requires that his theory of justice is
publicly known and hopefully publicly endorsed.113 If what is just is publicly
known and the laws fail to meet that standard of justice, the people may become
discontent. Such discontentment may lead to instability. So, Rawls adds his theory
of legitimacy to his theory of justice to deal with the problem of stability that may
result from a society failing to meet its publicly known standard of justice.114
Recall, the theory of legitimacy aims at showing when the laws are
justifiably enforced even if they are less-than-just. If the laws are legitimate even
if they are less-than-just, then individuals should respect political authority and
individuals have a duty to obey the law. While Rawls recognizes that a just
society is the ideal, a less-than-just society can still be worthy of respect by its
citizens who are duty bound to obey the law, and that less-than-just society is
justified in perpetuating itself even through coercion. The hope is that a legitimate
though less-than-just society can be stable so that it can become increasingly just.
Without stability, a less-than-just society may face revolution rather than

111

Id. at 377.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 241.
113
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 120-122.
114
See FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 352-353 for a related point.
112
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incremental progress toward justice; without stability, a less-than-just society is
unlikely to achieve greater justice.115
While I agree that state coercion is necessary to maintain the stability of a
legal system and a society in general, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is insufficient
to justify state coercion in the criminal law. This claim is my main thesis.
To begin my defense of that thesis, note that the state uses various kinds of
coercion. The kinds of coercion vary from taxation to fines to community service,
to a deprivation of privileges or rights (e.g. the privilege to drive and right to vote)
to parole to probation to imprisonment to death. These categories are different
kinds of coercion rather than different degrees of coercion along a spectrum
because they affect an individual along different dimensions. For my purposes, I
do not need hard distinction between taxation and fines.116 I am making the
modest distinctions: taxation is different in kind from imprisonment and the death
penalty. More generally, the modest distinction is between state coercion that
affects individuals monetarily and state coercion that affects individuals in terms
of their liberties.
State coercion that affects individuals monetarily is primarily taxation and
fines. I will refer to these mechanisms as “monetary coercion.” State coercion that
affects individuals in terms of their liberties is community service, imprisonment,
and death.117 I will refer to these mechanisms as “liberty coercion.” Imprisonment
is the central example of liberty coercion because it is a common punishment and
it is a substantial infringement on a person’s liberty. When I speak of liberty
coercion from now on, I primarily have imprisonment in mind.
It is true that all laws that command or prohibit action affect one’s liberty;
taxing an individual deprives that person of the liberty to spend the amount of
money taxed as she wishes. This characteristic cuts across my distinction between
monetary and liberty coercion. However, I think the modest distinction is still
meaningful in that liberty coercion, whether in the law itself or the penalty of any
law, involves a deprivation of a basic liberty. Monetary coercion decreases one’s
liberty to use one’s money, but using all of one’s (pre-tax) money as one wishes is
not a basic liberty.118
115

I am not sure if Rawls specifically makes this point, but I think it consistent with his views
even if legitimacy (or justice) is never completely obtainable.
116
In practice, fines and taxation are difficult to distinguish. Fines are usually associated with
legal violations while taxation is not, but fines impact a person much like taxation. Though their
theoretical justification may vary, the practice of taxation and fines may be more similar than
different.
117
I group community service with liberty coercion because the person penalized with
community service must do some action; he cannot (legally) buy his way out or pay someone else
to do it.
118
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 227-230.
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I do not think the distinction between monetary and liberty coercion is that
controversial. Another way to view the distinction is that monetary coercion does
not restrict an individual's legal freedom (aside from what the law itself requires)
while liberty coercion does restrict an individual's legal freedom. By legal
freedom, I mean one's freedom to do what most citizens can do without legal
restriction.
When one's legal freedom is restricted, the state prohibits a person from
going certain places or doing certain things. (I distinguish below “legal freedom”
from “actual freedom” the latter being what one can actually do.) Monetary
coercion does not restrict a person's legal freedom because she can still go where
she wants and do what she wants as most citizens are able to do provided she has
the means (monetary or otherwise) to facilitate her action. Liberty coercion does
restrict a person's legal freedom in that the state prohibits a person from going
where she wants and doing what she wants (to some extent) no matter how much
money or resources she may have. For example, an imprisoned individual cannot
legally leave the prison, ceteris paribus, without permission regardless of how
much money she has. The person may still be actually free to do as she wants;
nevertheless, she is legally prohibited from doing so.
The distinction is based on legal freedom (not actual freedom) because
some individuals will still be able to do what they want (actual freedom) because
they are able to violate the governmental prohibition. Also, money talks. Some
rich individuals are able to circumvent governmental restrictions of their legal
freedom through illegal mechanisms such as bribes. Nevertheless, even if these
individuals’ actual freedom is not restricted as much as the government has
required, their legal freedom is still restricted because their going beyond the
governmental prohibition is illegal.
I take it I have said enough so far to make the distinction between
monetary coercion and liberty coercion plausible.119 Instead of developing the
distinction further, I turn to its implications for Rawls's theory of legitimacy.
The implication of the distinction between monetary coercion and liberty
coercion has to do with the justification for each kind of coercion. Since liberty
coercion is more severe than monetary coercion, the justification for instances of
liberty coercion must be stronger than the justification for instances of monetary
coercion. By “severe,” I mean to refer to how burdensome coercion is and how
important the coercion-limited liberty is.
To clarify, I am not claiming that all instances of liberty coercion are more
severe than all instances of monetary coercion. We need to keep in mind that both
monetary and liberty coercion come in degrees. Fines and taxes can be large or
119

Rawls makes a similar distinction for a different purpose. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE:
REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 314.
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small. Moreover, prison terms can vary from a day to a lifetime. For some people,
a large fine may be more severe than a weekend in jail. However, for most people
most of the time, monetary coercion is not as severe as liberty coercion.
Not only do I not need a stronger claim than the generalization in “mostclaim” for the remainder of my argument, but I only need the claim that some
instances of liberty coercion are more severe than monetary coercion. I argue
below that as laws involve increasingly severe coercion, these laws require
increasingly stringent justification (compared to the laws involving less severe
coercion). Consequently, my argument can be individualized to how each law
affects each individual. However, for simplicity and because I believe the more
general “most-claim” holds, I treat the claim in terms of the categories “liberty
coercion” and “monetary coercion” instead of a spectrum.
Many reasons support the generalization that most instances of liberty
coercion are more severe than most instances of monetary coercion; I mention
only a few. First, since democracies have dispensed with debtor’s prison, laws
involving only monetary coercion do not lead to liberty coercion. 120 Second, in
democratic societies with a welfare system, monetary coercion in the form of
taxes has a limit; the depth of one’s wallet. Those who are the worst off are often
taxed very little or are even subsidized through redistributive payments from the
taxes of others. Since fines also have a monetary impact, they too can be offset by
redistributive payments from a welfare system. Nevertheless, for most people
while taxation and fines affect them monetarily, the severity of this infringement
is not as severe as liberty coercion.
The third reason why liberty coercion can be more severe than monetary
coercion results from extant conditions in prison. Brutal violence including rape
takes place in many prisons, often committed by the prison guards.121 Moreover,
much of the prison population comprises people living with mental disabilities,
racial minorities, and the poor. The preponderance of these groups in the prison
population suggests that the criminal justice system unduly disfavors already
vulnerable groups. Thus, liberty coercion can excessive harm vulnerable groups
including the impacts that it has on the imprisoned’s family, especially their
dependents.
The final reason (I mention) that liberty coercion is more severe than
monetary coercion concerns the after-effects of imprisonment. After being
imprisoned, often a social stigma haunts one leading to social ostracism from
one's family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. The social stigma can also

120

Of course, the poor can be subject to liberty coercion if they cannot afford criminal fines. Yet,
such pertains to criminal fines not taxation.
121
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2008).
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impede acquiring a job or other social benefits such as adopting children.122 In
contrast, monetary coercion—even when it takes the form of a criminal fine—
often does not have as bad of a social stigma attached to it.
Due to the social stigma attached to liberty coercion and the way the
welfare system ameliorates some of the effects on the poor of monetary coercion,
most instances of liberty coercion are more severe than most instances of
monetary coercion. Aside from these two reasons, the intuitive point that most
people would rather pay a fine than go to jail also makes it plausible that for most
people liberty coercion is more severe than monetary coercion.
Once again, I am not insisting that all instances of liberty coercion are
more severe than all instances of monetary coercion for all people. My claim
pertains to what is generally true for most people. In most cases, liberty coercion
is more severe than monetary coercion. Furthermore, not only do I not need a
stronger claim than this “most-claim” for the remainder of my argument, but the
rest of my argument only needs the claim that some instances of liberty coercion
are more severe than monetary coercion. I argue below that as laws involve
increasingly severe coercion, these laws require increasingly stringent
justification (compared to the laws involving less severe coercion). Consequently,
this claim can be individualized to how each law affects each individual.
I have given some intuitive plausibility to: the distinction between liberty
coercion and monetary coercion; and the claim that liberty coercion is often more
severe than monetary coercion. I turn now to how these points suggest that liberty
coercion requires greater justification for its legitimacy than does monetary
coercion.
Since more severe coercion is more burdensome to those coerced, we
would expect that the more severe coercion is the greater the justification must be
for the coercion. Combining this point with the distinction between monetary and
liberty coercion, most laws that involve liberty coercion require greater
justification than most laws that involve only monetary coercion. I will call this
claim the “severity claim.”
By a “greater justification” in the severity claim, I mean several things. (In
fleshing out this concept, I also am providing intuitive reasons for the severity
claim.) One thing that is included in “greater justification” relates to the quality of
the purpose of the law. The more severe the coercion, the more worthy the
purpose of the law should be. For example, we punish the crime of murder with
life in prison or the death penalty because protecting innocent lives is a highly
worthy purpose. Since a person's life is irreplaceable and the most valuable asset
one has, punishing anyone who murders with a severe punishment such as life in

122

Id. at 6.
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prison is arguably justified. In contrast, life in prison for petty theft is unjustified
as the legacy of Les Miserables indicates.123
I am not arguing for the details of how to punish particular crimes. I am
making the more general intuitive claim: since most instances of liberty coercion
involve more severe coercion, we expect the purpose of such laws to be
proportionally more worthy of achieving. I refer to this aspect of “greater
justification” in the severity claim as the “proportionality constraint.”
Another aspect of the “greater justification” that we want included the
severity claim has to do with our confidence about the justification of the law. Not
only do we want the proportionality constraint satisfied, but we also want to be
confident about our beliefs about the worthiness of the law’s purpose. Confidence
comes in degrees. For example, we may think that unauthorized downloading of
music on the internet should be illegal, but we may not be confident about how
bad such a crime is. Perhaps, we would be comfortable with a modest fine for
downloading music, perhaps a civil remedy on top of the modest fine. But, given
the likely benefits for the artist and music industry of unauthorized downloading,
we may not be confident enough to punish such a crime with heavy fines. We
most likely would be unwilling to incarcerate someone over music downloading,
not just because of the proportionality constraint, but also because we may not be
that confident that we know just how bad of a crime music downloading is. Due
to this issue of confidence, the greater the severity of coercion, we want to be
more confident that the crime is worthy of punishing. In that sense, we want more
justification the greater the severity of coercion.
Other considerations go into what I mean by “greater justification” in the
severity claim. I will explore one of these in detail below. Mentioning it briefly,
we want greater procedural safeguards the more severe the kind of coercion as
indicated by many of constitutional rights dealing with how the state may enforce
the criminal law.
All of the reasons I have given so far are supposed to support the claim
that we have an intuition that due to their greater severity, most instances of
liberty coercion require greater justification than most instances of monetary
coercion (severity claim). I am not sure that I want to go so far as to say that the
severity claim is a considered conviction in the Rawlsian sense, although I think it
comes close. 124 Let me now turn to some contractarian and specifically some
Rawlsian reasons supporting the severity claim.
123

In the story, Jean Valjean merely steals a loaf of bread due to hunger for which he is
imprisoned with hard labor for years turning him into a hardened criminal. Now, such appears to
most people like a great injustice. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES, (Norman Denny trans.,
Penguin Books 1982) (1862).
124
See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 29 for Rawls’s definition of a considered
conviction.
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The general contractarian reason supporting the severity claim has to do
with the persuasiveness of the arrangement to be contracted. If individuals are
going to agree to a social contract, they need to be persuaded that one particular
contract is superior to any other social contract. My claim is that a social contract
that requires greater justification for the state to use liberty coercion than with
monetary coercion will be more persuasive or appealing of an arrangement to the
contractors than a social contract that requires the same moderate level of
justification for all kinds of state coercion.125
This contractarian claim is meant to apply to most forms of
contractarianism as long as the contractors doing the reasoning are situated
roughly fairly.126 Since all fairly-situated contractors would consider the chance
that they or someone they care about could be accused of a crime, whether
justifiably accused or not, most if not all contractors would want the justification
(in my sense) of liberty coercion to be greater than monetary coercion, due to the
greater severity of liberty coercion. The reason they would find the severity claim
persuasive is that that they are risking being subjected to more suffering if they
agree to a society with liberty coercion as opposed to a society that only uses
monetary coercion. (I am assuming that the contractors would want the more
severe liberty coercion to deter people from committing the core crimes.) Thus, to
balance off the increased risk of suffering the more severe liberty coercion, social
contractors would want each law involving liberty coercion to satisfy more
stringent standards of justification than the standards applied to laws involving
only monetary coercion.
I do not think I am begging the question in my general contractarian point.
Like Rawls, I am using a contractarian apparatus to flesh out the reasoning of
individuals who situated roughly fairly.127 Instead of developing the general
contractarian point, I turn to a reason for the severity claim that is specific to
Rawlsianism.
In Rawls’s two principles of justice, the first principle protects the basic
liberties of individuals while the second principle relates directly to the monetary
arrangement between individuals.128 I need not go further into the details of the
two principles; my point pertains to the relationship between Rawls’s two
principles of justice.

125

I have not space to address whether contractors would prefer greater stringency for all kinds
of coercion.
126
Even Hobbesian-type contractors could advocate for the severity claim, assuming the
sovereign could still effectively maintain peace (stability) with this constraint.
127
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 17.
128
Id. at 42. For brevity, I ignore the social inequalities aspect of Rawls’s second principle of
justice.
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The relationship I am referring to is the priority of the first principle over
the second principle. Part of Rawls’s theory is that a society must satisfy the first
principle first before it satisfies the second principle.129 Perhaps more accurately
for non-ideal theory, a society cannot improve its adherence to the second
principle by lessening its adherence to the first principle.130 The essential idea in
the priority of the first principle over the second principle is that a society is
unjust if it pursues greater wealth (even according to the difference principle)
when doing so leads to the equal basic liberties being achieved to a lesser extent.
Put simply, a society cannot pursue wealth by sacrificing equal basic liberties
among all citizens.
Rawls allows basic liberties to be traded-off against one another as long as
doing so is necessary to ensure equal basic liberties for all.131 By implication,
Rawls may be committed to the possibility that even some individuals’ equal
basic liberties may be drastically limited, at least in the short term, in special
circumstances where doing so is necessary to preserve the whole system of basic
liberties such as when the government faces overthrow. In sum, Rawls allows
basic liberties to be traded-off against other basic liberties in some cases.
However, Rawls does not allow equal basic liberties to be traded off for greater
monetary gain even when the greater monetary gain accords with the second
principle of justice.
From this brief explanation of the priority of the first principle over the
second, I want to draw support for the severity claim. Given the priority of basic
liberties over monetary gain in the priority Rawls builds into his two principles of
justice, we would expect a similar sort of distinction when it came to the state
taking away an individual’s basic liberties versus the state taking away a person’s
money. We expect such because to have basic liberties and money, an individual
needs both the state to provide institutions to provide for basic liberties and
monetary pursuit and the state needs to refrain from taking away one’s basic
liberties and too much of one’s money.
More specifically, with liberty coercion, the state is taking away a
person’s basic liberty to freedom of association and freedom of movement (often
in addition to other liberties such as rights of political participation). Rawls prizes
freedom of association and freedom of movement highly among the basic
liberties.132 Thus, liberty coercion is severe in that it deprives an individual some
of her most important basic liberties.

129

Id. at 43-46.
Assuming, perhaps, that the two options are mutually exclusive.
131
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 178-79.
132
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 39, at 228.
130
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In contrast, while taking away a person’s money is still coercion, I argued
above monetary coercion is often not as severe as taking away a person’s basic
liberties. Back to Rawls, he attaches differential importance to the basic liberties
over greater wealth in the priority Rawls gives to the first principle over the
second principle. From this differential importance, we can infer that, in Rawls’s
view, the basic liberties are more important than greater wealth (assuming
subsistence is met). Applying this aspect of Rawls’s theory of justice to state
coercion, we find support for the premise of the severity claim: liberty coercion is
(often) more severe than monetary coercion.
Assuming I am right about Rawlsian commitments, we would expect
Rawls to treat laws that involve liberty coercion differently from laws that involve
monetary coercion. The differential treatment need not involve some sort of
priority of one over the other because we do not need to trade-off one kind of
coercion for the other. Instead, I am proposing that the differential treatment
should be the severity claim: laws that threaten the deprivation of the basic
liberties (liberty coercion) need greater justification than the laws that only
threaten individuals’ monetary situation (monetary coercion).
In summary, Rawls’s theory of justice supports the severity claim. Due to
the priority of the principle that protects the basic liberties over the principle
concerned with wealth distribution, we see that Rawls finds basic liberties more
important than greater wealth. To that extent, we would expect Rawls to agree
that state coercion that deprives individuals of basic liberties is more severe (in
most cases) than state coercion that deprives individuals of a portion of their
money (assuming subsistence). If so, then the severity claims follows. The
“greater justification” required by the severity claim is analogous to the priority
that Rawls attaches to the first principle over the second. Since preserving equal
basic liberties is so important, the state should have greater justification for laws
that threaten to deprive individuals of those basic liberties than for laws that
involve only monetary coercion.
Since the points I have made so far figure into my argument in the next
section, I will be returning them below. Let it suffice for now that I have made
plausible two claims (including support from Rawls’s theory of justice). First,
liberty coercion is more severe than monetary coercion in most cases. Second, due
to its greater severity, most laws involving liberty coercion require greater
justification than most laws involving only monetary coercion (severity claim). In
the next section, I will argue that the severity claim indicates that Rawls’s theory
of legitimacy needs to be more stringent for it to properly assess the legitimacy of
laws that involve liberty coercion.
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Section Four: Legitimate Liberty Coercion
In this section, my main objective is to develop the points from above to
suggest that Rawls's theory of legitimacy needs to be more stringent when
assessing laws involving liberty coercion. To begin, recall, Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy is supposed to show how the state may acceptably use coercion to
enforce the law. Enforcing the law is important because, according to Rawls,
enforcing the law is necessary to maintain stability of a society over time.133
Of course, Rawls does not want a law enforced regardless of its merit.134
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is supposed to tell us which less-than-just laws may
still be justifiably enforced. Recall that for Rawls, laws have to meet the three
requirements: supported by public reason, endorsed democratically, and not-toounjust. Thus, as long as the laws meet these three requirements, states can
justifiably enforce their laws, even if some laws are less-than-just, to ensure social
stability.
The question is whether Rawls’s three requirements (public reason,
democratic endorsement, and not-too-unjust) for a law to be legitimate are
adequate to the task of justifying the use of state coercion. I am not sure how to
decisively answer this question. In this paper, I want to make a more modest claim
that while the legitimating requirements Rawls uses may be sufficient for laws
involving monetary coercion, it is dubitable that these legitimating requirements
are sufficient for at least some laws involving liberty coercion. In other words, I
contend that Rawls’s requirements for legitimacy are not stringent enough for
laws involving liberty coercion. Note, how much is “enough” is always hard to
measure. I hope to stack up the reasons so that the case for making Rawls’s theory
of legitimacy more stringent for laws involving liberty coercion is more
persuasive than leaving the theory as it is.
First, I want to grant for the sake of argument that Rawls’s requirements of
legitimacy (public reason, democracy, and not-too-unjust) are enough to justify
laws that involve only monetary coercion.135 While I do not defend this claim, I
will offer one reason why I think Rawls theory of legitimacy may justify laws
involving only monetary coercion to contrast why his theory does not justify laws
involving liberty coercion.
One reason why Rawls’s theory of legitimacy may be sufficient to justify
the laws involving monetary coercion results from the substantive requirement
that the laws be not-too-unjust. While I stated above that this requirement is
vague, I do not think it is hopelessly vague. One minimal standard Rawls draws
from this requirement is that the law cannot put individuals below subsistence
133
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(while others are above subsistence).136 Hence, for Rawls, if individuals are below
subsistence, the society is too unjust.
Requiring that laws involving monetary coercion (taxation and fines) does
not put an individual below subsistence is a reasonable requirement for a law’s
legitimacy. As long as one is at or above subsistence, one can make use of one’s
basic liberties to a meaningful extent. Since many of life’s meaningful activities
do not require more wealth than subsistence, especially with many state-provided
goods such as libraries, parks, and museums, a person with subsistence can live a
minimally decent if not meaningful life. Hence, Rawls’s requirement that the laws
involving monetary coercion does not put one below subsistence is reasonable to
assess their legitimacy. At least, such is granted.
In contrast to monetary coercion, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is not
stringent enough to assess the legitimacy of laws involving liberty coercion. I
think the main requirement that is not stringent enough is the not-too-unjust
requirement. To see why I focus on this substantive requirement, let me point out
how the public reason and democratic endorsement requirements do not
necessarily prevent unjust laws.
Above I pointed out that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not directly
use the strength of public reasons directly to justify the legitimacy of a law. At
most, the strength of a public reason only plays a role indirectly in the democratic
deliberation where the society determines whether to enact the law relevant to that
public reason.137
Since Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not directly use the strength of
public reasons to justify the legitimacy of a law, then it is possible that laws that
involve liberty coercion can be legitimate (according to Rawls) even if the laws
are supported by only weak public reasons. By weak public reasons, I am
referring to the reasons in favor of the law being either weak in themselves or
weak compared to the reasons against the law.
Given the severity of many instances of liberty coercion, it is at least
surprising that Rawls thinks that laws that involve liberty coercion can be made
legitimate even supported by only weak public reasons. Below I will argue it is
more than surprising but actually problematic for Rawls’s theory. I will also
develop some examples of laws that are at best supported by weak public reasons
but are arguably illegitimate. As a preview, these laws are those that prohibit
certain non-violent conduct such as laws against drugs and prostitution. The
essence of these examples is that weak public reasons support them, yet they are
illegitimate, at least in so far as liberty coercion is used to enforce them.
136
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Before we get to these examples, let’s not forget that laws supported by
weak public reasons still have to be democratically endorsed and the substance of
the law itself must be not-too-unjust. Nevertheless, these two additional
requirements are not stringent enough for Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to justify
laws involving liberty coercion.
Consider first the democracy requirement. It is possible that laws
supported by only weak public reasons can be passed democratically.
Representative democracies are infamous for such laws when legislators vote
swap, make pork-barrel laws, and follow the fervent of the masses. Direct
democratic law-making can also make laws based on weak public reasons when
the masses are biased, misinformed, fooled by propaganda, mesmerized by
celebrities, selfish, incited by extreme events, and so on.
If the law passed democratically is not supported by any public reasons,
then that law is not legitimate according to Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. But, as
long as the democratically endorsed law is supported by a public reason, even if
weak in itself or weak compared to the countervailing public reasons, then that
law meets the public reason requirement and the democratic endorsement
requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy. So, the democracy requirement of
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not guarantee that laws only supported by weak
public reasons will not be enacted.
The extent to which the not-too-unjust requirement delegitimizes a law is
complicated. I mentioned above that despite the vagueness of the not-too-unjust
requirement, we could safely assume that monetary coercion would be too-unjust
if it made an individual fall below subsistence. Unlike this fixed point with
monetary coercion, the not-too-unjust requirement is harder to pin down with
liberty coercion. I am not claiming that liberty coercion will always fail to meet
the requirement of being not-too-unjust. Life in prison for vandalism is clearly
too-unjust. Yet, less obvious is what is too unjust in cases not so extreme. Life in
prison may or may not be too-unjust for murder; intuitions among people and
across cultures will vary on such issues. For example, the U.S. has prison terms
that are 5 to 10 times longer than those in France and Germany for similar
crimes.138
My guess is that many individuals have moderate to strong intuitions
about the appropriate punishment for murder, though these intuitions differ
among people and across cultures. However, I think our intuitions are less strong
with other severe crimes such as rape. Is ten years in prison too-unjust for rape?
When it comes to other crimes that do not involve physical harm such as white
collar crime, robbery, and tax evasion our intuitions about what is too-unjust are
even weaker. Some empirical data suggests that Americans ordinally rank the
138
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severity of core crimes similarly.139 Yet, attaching specific prison terms to each
crime has been more judicial art(ifice) than science.
The problem of vagueness in the not-too-unjust requirement sketched in
the preceding paragraph indicates the beginning of a solution. I mentioned in
section two that Rawls’s theory of justice lacks a companion theory of criminal
justice (i.e., theory of criminalization, theory of punishment, and a theory of
regulation). A companion theory of criminal justice would help mitigate the
vagueness of the not-too-unjust requirement because we would see, more clearly,
what justice requires regarding liberty coercion. I say “companion” theory
because Rawls’s theory of legitimacy need not create its own theory of criminal
justice. Rather, it needs a theory of criminal justice to draw upon for the not-toounjust requirement to have any actual content pertaining to liberty coercion.
To be fair to Rawls, he may have had in mind a theory of criminal justice
included in his not-too-unjust requirement. To my knowledge, Rawls does not
clarify this point. Regardless, I think I have demonstrated the need for a theory of
criminal justice in order for Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to apply to large
sections of the legal system including the penalties for any law. To that extent, we
should read Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as assuming a substantive requirement
for constitutional essentials, basic justice, and criminal justice.
The extent of my thesis is not merely Rawls’s theory of legitimacy needs
to include a theory of criminal justice. While I think that emphasizing the need for
a theory of criminal justice is an important addition to Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy, I think it is not enough to deal with the concerns I have raised. Once
we see the need for a theory of criminal justice, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy
needs to be made more stringent.
The increased stringency consists in greater scrutiny of the substance of
laws and their penalties especially when such involve liberty coercion.140 The
tricky question is how much more stringent do laws involving liberty coercion
need to be compared to laws involving only monetary coercion. I will try to draw
such a distinction. I call the more stringent version of the substantive requirement
to replace Rawls’s not-too-unjust requirement the “strong version.”
Strong version: for most laws involving liberty coercion to be legitimate
the laws and their penalties must be almost-just.
How much more just is almost-just than Rawls’s not-too-unjust is obviously a
hard distinction make. Recall the analogy to letter grades. Rawls’s theory of
139
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legitimacy requires that a law earn a “B” grade (not-too-unjust). The strong
version requires an “A-” grade (almost-just) for the law to be legitimate.
Put differently, by almost-just, I mean that the laws can only be a hair’s
breadth below justice. To put the distinction in other words, almost-just means
that the laws are just, plus or minus a small margin of error. Once again, if we had
a persuasive theory of criminal justice, the distinction between almost-just and
not-too-unjust would be easier to make. In lieu of having such a theory, below I
identify some fixed points where we can meaningfully distinguish the strong
version from Rawls’s moderate version.
Before doing so, I use the severity claim to defend the strong version.
Recall, since liberty coercion is often very severe, we would expect greater
justification for imposing liberty coercion than we do for monetary coercion
(severity claim). The severity claim supports (something like) the strong version
because the strong version requires a higher standard of justice for laws involving
liberty coercion.
Since the severity claim supports the strong version, the Rawlsian reason
in favor of the severity claim also supports the strong version. The importance of
this reason merits repeating it quickly. From the priority Rawls gives to the first
principle, we can infer that the protection of equal basic liberties is more
important for Rawls than incremental greater wealth beyond subsistence. Since
the protection of equal basic liberties is more important, most laws involving
liberty coercion require greater justification than most laws involving only
monetary coercion.
The strong version is also supported by the intuitive point that leads to the
severity claims. Most forms of punishment involving liberty coercion are quite
severe. With imprisonment in particular, we are depriving the imprisoned the
freedom to self-regulate basic aspects of his life such as what, when, and where he
eats. The imprisoned are controlled and governed in ways that livestock are
governed, even though most of the imprisoned still have some basic rights such as
the right to life. To justifiably subject a person to such a severe punishment as
imprisonment, the laws should be just or, at least, almost-just. Using such severe
coercion as imprisonment without the relevant law and its penalty being almostjust seems indefensible.
A further point in support of the strong version comes from the U.S.
Constitution. We have evidence that the beliefs embodied in U.S. Constitution
endorse the strong version. As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. Constitution has
stringent requirements that the criminal justice system must meet in order to
inflict a punishment on an individual. The rights to trial by jury, habeas corpus,
non-self-incrimination, no double jeopardy, and only reasonable searches and
seizures are some of procedural requirements that the state must meet in using
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coercion to enforce a law. In contrast, the right against cruel and unusual
punishment is substantive requirement of the criminal law.
In many instances, if one or more of the criminal procedural requirements
are not met, the Constitution forbids convicting and punishing the accused to any
extent. For example, if the state obtained all of the evidence against the accused
via unreasonable searches and seizures, then the evidence would be inadmissible
and the accused would be neither convicted nor punished. These stringent
constitutional rights governing the procedures for enforcing the law indicate that,
to a large extent, we would rather err on the side of not punishing some violators
of the law rather than administer punishments through an unjust procedure. Since
these constitutional procedural protections are highly valued and, in many ways,
most U.S citizens take them for granted, they seem to be considered convictions
or approaching such.
These constitutional rights concerning the procedure for enforcing the law
are likely to be part of a persuasive theory of criminal justice. It is this theory of
criminal justice that I pointed out is missing from Rawls’s theory of legitimacy.
Since we seem committed to not using liberty coercion unless the procedural
rights in the Constitution are met, I want to extrapolate from that to the whole
theory of criminal justice needed in Rawls’s theory of legitimacy.
If we are not willing to use liberty coercion because we value the
procedural rights in the Constitution, then we should similarly be unwilling to use
liberty coercion if other aspects of a persuasive theory of criminal just are not also
met. Perhaps, not every minute aspect of a theory of criminal justice would be so
important to override the legitimacy of a law involving liberty coercion. However,
at the core aspects of the theory of criminal justice will be that important such that
not meeting them will delegitimize the law and its enforcement. Consequently,
the rights protected in the Constitution are not the only aspects of a theory of
criminal justice that would need to be met to avoid delegitimizing a law involving
liberty coercion. Rather, many other aspects including principles on what can be
criminalized and how and to what extent can the violation of criminal laws be
punished, the substantive constitutional right against cruel and unusual
punishment being one of them. While I will not defend the claim here, I think that
the substantive aspects of criminal justice are just as important, if not more
important, than the procedural rights of criminal justice protected in the
Constitution.
All of the arguments I have given so far for increasing the stringency of
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy for laws involving liberty coercion support the
strong version of the substantive requirement. The main reasons are as follows:
1. Liberty coercion involves a more severe form of coercion than
monetary coercion
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2. The greater the severity of coercion, the greater the need of
justification for a law.
3. Liberty coercion as a punishment involves a severe deprivation of
basic liberties. Hence, we must have strong reasons to deprive
individuals of their basic liberties.
4. Many Constitutional rights require procedural criminal justice for the
state to justifiably punish. Similarly, substantive criminal justice
should be (at least) almost met before the state can justifiably punish
with liberty coercion.
I think I have said enough about these four reasons to make them plausible.
Instead, of developing them further I want to illustrate some ways that the strong
version would delegitimize extant laws that Rawls’s theory may not delegitimize.

Section Five: Delegitimizing Certain Non-violent Criminal Laws
One difficulty with Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, which I mentioned
previously, is the vagueness of the not-too-unjust requirement. I do not claim to
have solved this difficulty. Until we have a persuasive theory of criminal justice
to add to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, vagueness still remains to some
extent even with the strong version of the substantive requirement. In this section,
I hope to combat some of this vagueness by identifying a fixed point in the realm
of criminal justice where we can gauge how the strong version (compared to
Rawls’s moderate version) of the substantive requirement would evaluate part of
the extant criminal law in the United States.
As I mentioned in passing above, certain existing criminal laws violate
criminal justice. One illuminating set of examples pertain to certain non-violent
crimes such as drug use and prostitution. I aim to argue that Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy, as it stands, justifies the extant criminalization of such conduct.
Furthermore, this justification of criminal sanctions against such conduct
should trouble us. As a solution, I contend that the strong version of the
substantive requirement that I am proposing would not justify the extant troubling
laws pertaining to such conduct. To that extent, we should prefer that the strong
version of the substantive requirement replace Rawls’s not-too-unjust
requirement.
To begin my argument, “self-regarding” conduct is one way of
characterizing the conduct I have in mind. The problem with that term is that most
conduct can and does affect other people. Not all conduct does. My favorite is
example is scratching my leg when no one else is around. Such scratching clearly
need not affect other people, although we could imagine bizarre circumstances in
which it did.
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Nevertheless, the types of criminalized conduct, which I am targeting, in
the extant law can and often do affect other people. The point of the conduct, with
which I am taking issue, is not that such conduct does not ever affect other
people. Rather, the point is that in their direct effects, they only affect the person
performing the conduct. If such conduct affects other people, they do so
indirectly. By indirectly I mean that, in most instances, such conduct affects the
person performing the conduct (directly) and then the person who was affected
directly may do something that affects another person as a result of the direct
effects of the “self-regarding” conduct. These indirect effects of “self-regarding
conduct” are worth distinguishing from the direct effects because the indirect
effects may not happen, vary greatly among people, are often separated from the
direct effects by a significant stretch of time, and can often be
ameliorated/avoided by planning or third-party intervention. Without a more apt
term, I reluctantly use “self-regarding conduct” as I have just explained.
To illustrate, consider an argument that people opposed to drug use often
employ to contend that drug use is not self-regarding. They contend that drug use
causes child neglect and/or abuse (child abuse, for short).141 Set aside the fact that
not all drug use causes child abuse since not all drug use leads those who have or
are around children to abuse them. Let’s grant the minimal claim that at least
some people who use drugs end up abusing their children some of the time in part
because of the drug use.
Even granting such a minimal claim, the drug use that leads to child abuse
is still self-regarding conduct. The direct effect of the drug use is an alteration of
the psychological state of the person who ingests the drug. This psychological
effect on the person using the drug is a direct effect. In certain circumstances for
certain people, the psychological effect of the drug on the user will lead that
person to abuse a child. However, the child abuse is an indirect effect. The abuse
of the child only resulted because of certain circumstances obtaining such as the
child being present after the drug was ingested and the child abuse could have
been avoided by planning to have the child in another location or under the care
of another competent adult who could protect the child. Even if one is not
convinced that drug use is self-regarding conduct, the concept is still cogent
because there are other examples of clearly self-regarding conduct that has been
criminalized in the past such as masturbation, homosexual sex, and sodomy.
Once again, I am not mounting a thorough defense of the concept of selfregarding conduct. I hope what I have said has explicated the concept of selfregarding conduct along with making the concept plausible. From now on, I will
assume that the concept of self-regarding conduct is coherently applied to the
examples use.
141
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One further clarificatory point concerning self-regarding conduct is that
self-regarding conduct need not involve only one person. Some of the above
examples involve more than one person such as prostitution. Conduct involving
more than one person is still self-regarding as long as all involved are consenting,
adults.142
Once again, for illustrative purposes, prostitution can have indirect otherregarding effects—both positive and negative. Prostitution can have positive
indirect other-regarding effects in that by fulfilling a person’s basic sexual needs,
in reducing that person’s stress, and in providing companionship to the lonely,
that person may be better able to meet other people’s needs and function better at
work. At the same time, prostitution can have negative indirect other-regarding
effects such as causing conflict and even violence between married people and
transmitting disease. Even with these possible positive and negative indirect
effects, prostitution is still a self-regarding conduct because the direct effect of the
conduct in terms of physical sensation only affects the prostitute and the
customer.
With these clarificatory remarks, I offer some reasons why if we amend
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to include the strong version of the substantive
requirement, laws involving liberty coercion that criminalizes self-regarding
conduct would be illegitimate. To make this claim, let me first say why I think
that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy, as it stands, would justify some of the extant
laws against self-regarding conduct.
Many extant laws criminalizing self-regarding conduct meets Rawls’s
three requirements of legitimacy.143 This result of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy
should trouble us because these extant laws are troubling. I will use the drug laws
as the primary example to make this claim, even though a similar argument could
be made with other criminalized self-regarding conduct such as prostitution and
gambling. While states are starting to modify laws against drug possession, the
reform is by no means complete.144 Additionally, criminal laws against drug
production and trafficking are in force in the entire United States. I will refer to all
of these laws as “drug laws.”145
Drug laws meet the public reason requirement of Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy. Some of the public reasons in favor of drug laws are as follows: drugs
harm physical and mental health; drugs involve destructive addictions. I think
142
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these are weak public reasons in both senses that I stipulated above; the public
reasons themselves are weak and the countervailing public reasons against drug
laws are strong.
For example, the claims about the ill effects of drugs are overstated. What
is especially grossly exaggerated (most notably in popular opinion) is the
incidence of drug addiction among drug users. The popular idea that drug use
always leads to drug addiction is a myth.146 Another exaggeration is the difficulty
of going through withdrawal. A reliable description of heroin withdrawal has
likened it to the unpleasantness of a moderate flu; such does not seem that bad.147
Since many think drug withdrawal is intensely painful, the extent of withdrawal is
also exaggerated.
I am not denying that drugs can destroy some people’s health and lead to
some deaths. I am also not denying that overcoming drug addiction is hard and
that drug addiction can lead people to destroy their relationships and employment.
However, many of these negative aspects of drug use could be ameliorated
through education on how to use drugs safely and through medical care for those
who have become addicted. These ameliorative programs are either too few or not
sought after largely because of the drug laws themselves. Quite possibly, if the
drug laws were repealed the negative effects drugs have on many people’s lives
would be substantially mitigated. Keep in mind though, as I mentioned above,
drugs do not always have negative effects on people’s health. For these reasons,
public reasons in favor of drug laws exist, but are weak.
Let me quickly note that one of the main reasons that people in favor of
the drug laws offer in support of them is not a public reason. James Q. Wilson,
former head of the National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse Prevention, states,
“Cocaine alters one’s soul.”148 Wilson and others claim that drug use is so
immoral that it must be criminally prohibited.149 They do not offer much more
explanation of their moral claim beyond stating it. I am merely flagging that this
moral claim is not a public reason because it depends on highly controversial
moral beliefs that are not widely held.
In addition to the public reasons supporting drug laws being weak in
themselves, the countervailing public reasons against the drug laws are strong.
The strongest public reasons have to do with the freedom to manage one’s own
body and health. While this public reason is moral in nature, it is so universally
146
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accepted, at least in the abstract, that it is not controversial. Just the opposite. This
commitment to freedom in one’s body and health is presupposed by the
commitment to allow people to pursue, even minimally, a diversity of lifestyles
and conceptions of the good (freedom to eat what one wants).
There are some controversial exceptions to the nearly universal
commitment to freedom in one’s body and health. The most notable exception is
abortion. But note that abortion has a direct effect on another living entity.
Therefore, for most people who oppose abortion, it is not self-regarding conduct
since they assume that the other living entity, the fetus, is not consenting to the
abortion. To that extent, it seems that the freedom for a person to manage her
body or health is only challengeable when it conflicts with the life of another
(purported) person (and even this limitation is controversial).
Another controversial exception to the commitment to freedom to one’s
body and health is the legal limitation on how one can end one’s own life. For
brevity, suffice it to say while the right to die is still controversial, the actual
practice of medicine in hospice care and with living wills indicates that attitudes
about how much control individuals should have over their death seem to be
changing.150 The change is in the direction of giving individuals and their families
more freedom over their body and their health even when it comes to their own
death. Since the freedom to manage one’s body and health is a widely recognized
freedom, this freedom counts as a public reason against drug laws.
Another public reason against drug laws contends the exact opposite of the
main public reason in favor of drug laws. While for some people drugs can have
negative effects on their health, for others just the opposite is the case. Using
drugs helps their physical and mental health.151 Marijuana is the best known drug
for possibly having healing properties not found in even prescription drugs.152
Heroin has obvious palliative uses.153 Aside from these specific cases, a more
general point can be made. Drugs make people feel good; that is one major reason
people use them. To the extent that drugs make people feel good, people receive
benefits at least to their mental health.154 Better mental health can spill over to
physical health as well as other areas of one’s life. Remember many people use
drugs without addiction or any of the horror stories that the “War on Drugs”
campaign portrays as imminent.
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From the analysis above, we can conclude that there are public reasons on
both sides of the controversy over the drug laws. Since Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy does not assess the strength of public reasons, having merely some
weak public reasons in favor of the drug laws is sufficient to meet the requirement
of public reason. Therefore, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy does not allow us to
evaluate the public reasons for and against drug laws to determine whether the
drug laws are legitimate.
Moving on, I will not spend time arguing that the extant drug laws have
satisfied the democratic endorsement requirement of Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy. The fact that they have been passed through an arguably democratic
process and that most of the citizenry support them should suffice to establish that
the extant drug laws have been democratically endorsed.155 Instead, I will just
reiterate that Rawls relies on the democratic process (and perhaps implicitly J.S.
Mill’s “marketplace of ideas”) to correctly assess the strength of public reasons
and balance out the public reasons for and against a law.156 If the democratic
process does not do this assessment and balancing correctly, the only check
against unjust laws that Rawls’s theory legitimacy has is in the third requirement
concerning the substance of the law.157
Turning to that substantive requirement, determining whether the drug
laws are too-unjust is difficult because of the reasons already stated: the
vagueness of the standard and the lack of a complete theory of criminal justice.
Nevertheless, the majority of Americans seem to think that the drug laws are
roughly just, exceeding Rawls’s requirement of that laws be not-too-unjust.158 I
will contest this point later. But, it is an interesting social phenomenon that so
many Americans think that the drug laws are just.
Of course, a minority of Americans think the drug laws are unjust. Yet,
this minority has not been able to garner enough political momentum even to
bring the drug laws under serious reconsideration. One success in modifying the
drug laws has been a change from incarcerating those convicted of drug
possession to requiring those convicted to go into a drug rehabilitation
program.159 This change in the form of punishment has likely been motivated by
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the prisons being overcrowded.160 In other words, the change in sentencing for
drug possession may have resulted from the practical problems of the penal
system rather than a burgeoning awareness that criminalizing drug possession is
unjust. The overwhelming majority of Americans who think the drug laws are just
lends some support to the minimal claim that drug laws may be not-too-unjust.
Some reasons support that extant drug laws are not-too-unjust given their
actual impact in their current context. In other words, the drug laws are part of a
social system with both formal and informal parts that combine to cause many
social ills. Since they are a part of a social system that would be worse, at least in
the short run, without the drug laws, the drug laws may not be too-unjust. Let me
clarify what I mean.
Drug laws interact with a complex system of drug production, drug
trafficking, and drug use. Currently, the drug production, trafficking, and use
causes or reinforces many social problems including organized crime, gang
warfare, spreading disease, violence, and exploitation of racial minorities, women,
the poor, and children. Even though the drug laws and the war on drugs in general
have created or exacerbated many of these social ills, eliminating the drug laws
altogether in a short period may make these social ills along with other public
health concerns worse. To decriminalize drugs without making the status quo
worse, the legal change would have to be incremental and accompanied by many
programs in education and public assistance to help transition the status quo to a
legal regime where drugs are legal.161
Since we have neither these programs nor the political will to create them,
the drug laws may be necessary to avoid an even greater social disaster than they
have currently created. In an ironic sense, the American social system is
“addicted” to the drug laws. The system is not willing to “quit” the drug laws
through well-funded programs, and the sudden “withdrawal” from the drug laws
may be more unjust than the status quo. Thus, given the current social system and
political climate in which the drug laws function, the drug laws may not be too
unjust.
Even though the drug laws (as well as other criminalized self-regarding
conduct such as prostitution and gambling) may be not-too-unjust given the
current social contexts in which they function, I do not think these laws are
almost-just, especially when violators are punished with liberty coercion. In other
words, even considering the social context of extant laws that criminalize self-
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regarding conduct, these laws fail the strong version of the substantive
requirement because they are not almost-just.
To begin, I first will say briefly why criminalizing self-regarding conduct
through liberty coercion is unjust. After doing so, I will give some reasons why
drug laws in particular and laws criminalizing self-regarding conduct in general
are not almost-just—even considering their social context.
The main reasons why justice requires the freedom to engage in selfregarding conduct are similar to the reasons I gave above concerning why liberty
coercion is a severe form of coercion. Recall, parties to a social contract want to
be able to pursue their diverse, conflicting conceptions of the good. One
reasonable step to obtaining this goal is ensuring that everyone is at least able to
engage in self-regarding conduct. To that extent, the general contract perspective
in general seems to support the freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct.
The other reason I gave above was that liberty coercion is severe because
it restricts basic liberties, liberties that are given priority over greater wealth in
Rawls’s theory of justice. Similarly, as I pointed out when discussing the public
reasons against drug laws, the freedom to manage one’s body and health is a
widely endorsed freedom. Combine that with the freedom of association and
movement that Rawls explicitly protects as basic liberties in his first principle of
justice and we have support for the freedom to do most if not all self-regarding
conduct. In other words, freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct is part of
the basic liberties (not necessarily “constitutional essentials” or “basic justice”
which even Rawls’s moderate theory of legitimacy would protect). If I am correct,
then Rawls’s justice as fairness in particular requires as a matter of justice that
individuals be free to engage in self-regarding conduct.
Now that I have made plausible the claim that that (criminal and/or
Rawlsian social) justice forbids the criminalization of self-regarding conduct, I
will now give some reasons why the extant laws that criminalize self-regarding
conduct are not almost-just, even when we consider the social system in which
they operate. Drug laws again are the focus of my analysis, but similar claims can
be made for other criminalized self-regarding conduct. I realize I am riding a fine
line because I argued that the social system in which the drug laws operate make
these laws not-too-unjust. Yet, I think that holding the extant drug laws to the
standard of not-too-unjust is too lax. Aspiring to drug laws that are just or almostjust would provide a more persuasive standard to justify the legitimate use of
liberty coercion.
One reason to believe that the extant drug laws are not almost-just, even
considering the system in which they function, is the excessive amount of
punishment attached to violations of drug laws. The three-strikes laws are the best
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example of excessive punishment.162 If one is convicted of three felonies, even if
they are non-violent drug-related crimes, one is automatically sentenced to life in
prison. Life in prison for non-violent felonies related to either the production,
trafficking, or possession of drugs cannot be almost-just.
It is true that keeping some people involved with the drug world in prison
benefits (to some minimal extent) the social system in which the drug laws
function. Perhaps, as I argued in general above, life in prison for three drugrelated felonies is not-too-unjust given the violence that is risked in many of these
felonies. If so, then the laws would meet Rawls’s moderate standard of
legitimacy. However, such an excessive punishment as life in prison for three
non-violent felonies cannot be almost-just. If so, then the extant drug laws with
excessive punishments such as the three strikes laws are not legitimate according
to the strong version of the substantive requirement.
Another related point to the excessive punishment that indicates that the
extant drug laws are not almost-just is that less severe yet effective punishments
are available for drug law violations. Violations of most drug laws are punishable
by liberty coercion usually imprisonment. These punishments for violations of the
drug laws could be made less severe by using other forms of liberty coercion
(house arrest, drug rehab, community service) and by using more often only
monetary coercion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to revise in detail the penal
code concerning drug laws. The basic idea is that fines and less severe forms of
liberty coercion can be used as drug laws penalties.
Another modest reform indicates that the current drug laws are not almostjust concerns marijuana. Marijuana could be completely decriminalized but still
regulated through monetary coercion, primarily taxation. Decriminalizing
marijuana and regulating it through taxation would accomplish three goals. First,
those who use more harmful drugs would have incentive to switch to using
marijuana to avoid criminal sanctions. Second, given that marijuana has few
harmful health consequences (less than alcohol), is non-addictive, and has healing
properties, the health of users of other drugs (including alcohol) who switch to
marijuana would likely improve. Finally, the funds derived from taxing marijuana
could be used for public programs to ameliorate any negative effects of marijuana
itself and also to ameliorate the negative effects of other drugs. Thus,
decriminalizing marijuana would make the drug laws, as a whole, less severe.
Since the extant system refuses to completely decriminalize marijuana, does not
opt for less severe liberty coercion as penalties for drug laws, and does not use
monetary coercion only to penalize some drug laws, the extant drug laws seem to
fail the strong substantive requirement; extant drug laws are not almost-just.
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It is worth mentioning briefly that even a persuasive theory of criminal
justice would probably allow state regulation of some self-regarding conduct.
Self-regarding conduct that is criminalized currently can lead to extreme social
problems if they were decriminalized without regulation. So, decriminalizing selfregarding conduct such as drugs, prostitution, and gambling does not mean that
the state would not have a continued role in these areas. That role may only be to
provide education about their potential dangers and how to avoid them.
Additionally, like alcohol and tobacco, the state’s role may be primarily taxing the
conduct to deal with any negative social effects and discourage excessive use. One
important difference between regulation of self-regarding conduct and the current
ways such conduct is criminalized is that regulation would primarily involve only
monetary coercion through taxation while the extant law primarily uses liberty
coercion. Since taxation allows the self-regarding conduct to be done legally (at a
price), individuals are not legally denied their basic liberty to engage in selfregarding conduct. As long as the taxation is reasonable, then a legal system that
only regulates self-regarding conduct would be almost-just if not completely just.
The greater justice involved by shifting from criminalizing drugs to taxing
drugs is an example of my earlier point about difference between Rawls’s theory
of legitimacy and the strong version. If drugs were only regulated through
taxation, then the coercion involve would be only monetary coercion. Recall I
granted above that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is adequate to justify laws
involving monetary coercion. To that extent, drug laws using only monetary
coercion would likely be not-too-unjust, meaning they would be legitimate
according to Rawls’s theory. The problem is that criminal laws against drugs
involve liberty coercion in their substance and often involve liberty coercion in
their punishment. To deal with these more severe forms of state coercion, we need
to adopt the more stringent substantive requirement of the strong version.
Another reason that the extant law is not almost-just concerns reciprocity.
Rawls values reciprocity considerably in his theory of justice and his theory of
legitimacy.163 Reciprocity should lead to rough consistency in the legal system
that concerns self-regarding conduct; each person should allow each other person
to whatever self-regarding conduct each prefers. In fact, no such consistency
exists.
In the extant legal system, some self-regarding conduct is unregulated,
some are regulated, and some are criminalized. No meaningful distinctions clearly
justify treating various self-regarding conduct in these separate legal categories.
The degree of risk to health and bodily integrity does not distinguish among selfregarding conduct. For example, I am legally permitted to climb a dangerous
163

RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 122-24; see also FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra
note 42, at 374.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254058

Page 43 of 54

Gregory Jay Hall

mountain greatly risking serious bodily injury and death to myself even if I am
under-skilled and unprepared for the climb. In contrast, I am legally prohibited
from ingesting drugs even if the risk is negligible and the risk is primarily a risk
only to myself.
Another example that I have alluded to is that adults are legally permitted
to consume alcohol even though such is regulated. At the same time, adults are
not legally permitted to consume marijuana even though science now indicates
that alcohol is addictive and destroys one’s health while marijuana is not
addictive, has negligible health risks, and even some health benefits. Other
examples abound. We are not able to excuse these examples as we did above
given the current social system in which they function because to some extent all
self-regarding conduct will exist in such social systems. Thus, we should still
expect similar treatment of self-regarding conduct given that they all function in
less than ideal circumstances. Consequently, the legal system treats self-regarding
conduct differently without meaningful distinctions to justify such.
Since the legal system treats self-regarding conduct differently without
meaningful distinctions, the legal system does not embody reciprocity for selfregarding conduct. Since the legal system does not embody reciprocity in this
area, at least some the laws involving self-regarding conduct are unlikely to be
almost-just. I am not sure how to make this reciprocity claim more precise.
Consider it another reason indicating that holding the extant laws to the strong
substantive requirement, as opposed to Rawls’s moderate requirement, would
likely reveal that many of these laws are illegitimate.
Finally, many of the extant laws involving self-regarding conduct are not
almost-just because there are laws that target specifically the indirect, otherregarding effects of self-regarding conduct. As I mentioned earlier, one key aspect
of conduct that makes it self-regarding is its other-regarding effects may not
occur, vary among instances, occur only after a long stretch of time, depend on
contingent circumstances, and can be nullified by planning or third-party
intervention.
My example above was when a person abuses a child while on drugs. The
point here is that criminalizing drugs in part because they lead to child abuse is
unneeded because other laws already prohibit child abuse regardless of what
caused the adult to abuse the child. Since the laws against child abuse include
child abuse resulting from the adult using drugs, the other-regarding effect (child
abuse) from drug use would still be criminalized even if drug use itself were not
criminalized. Since we do not even want to risk child abuse resulting from drug
use, a compromise legal approach would be decriminalize drug use in general, but
to criminalize drug use when children are nearby.
From the child abuse example, we see that we can separate out the selfregarding conduct with no negative indirect other-regarding effects from instances
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of the self-regarding conduct that risk negative other-regarding effects. Drug use
would be legal; drug use with children nearby would be illegal. This point about
drugs is generalizable to many types of self-regarding conduct. We could only
criminalize an otherwise self-regarding conduct when done in circumstances
where other-regarding effects are likely (e.g. individuals could be prohibited from
gambling with more than 2% of the annual income). Thus, we can use the
criminal law to target only the indirect, other-regarding effects of self-regarding
conduct without criminalizing all instances of the self-regarding conduct. The
narrower the criminal laws are when they pertain to self-regarding conduct, the
greater the freedom to engage in self-regarding conduct.
To the extent that the criminal laws involving self-regarding conduct are
not narrowly tailored to the circumstances where such can lead to negative otherregarding effects, the criminal laws are too broad. The excessive breadth of these
laws unjustifiably infringes the freedom of individuals to manage their own body
and health, their freedom of movement, and their freedom of association. Since
we can still get the benefits of criminalization by narrowly tailoring the criminal
laws to the other-regarding effects, even if the criminal laws that broadly prohibit
self-regarding conduct are not-too-unjust, these laws are not almost-just.
So far, I have suggested some of the effects of strengthening the
substantive requirement of Rawls’s theory of legitimacy to the strong version.
Employing the strong version would indicate that many extant criminal laws
especially those involving liberty coercion for self-regarding conduct are
illegitimate. To the extent that these criminal laws are illegitimate, state coercion
to enforce these laws is unjustified.
In response to my suggestion that many of the extant criminal laws are
illegitimate, an objector may worry that making more stringent Rawls’s theory of
legitimacy may frustrate Rawls’s stated goal of his theory. Recall that Rawls aims
to show how a society with a less-than-just legal structure can still justifiably use
coercion to maintain stability. If my strengthening the requirements of the
legitimate use of state coercion ends up showing that enforcing many of the
state’s laws is unjustifiable, then the strong version of theory of legitimacy fails to
show how a less-than-just society, at least one like the United States, can
justifiably use state coercion to maintain stability. The worry is that many extant
societies cannot justifiably perpetuate themselves. If so, then those states on their
way to becoming more just cannot justifiably use state coercion to maintain their
current level of justice. In the next section, I respond to this worry.

Section Six: Illegitimate Law and Stability
Let me explicate further the worry I am responding to in this section.
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy aims to tell us when state coercion is justifiable so
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that the state can maintain the stability of the society over time. By making more
stringent Rawls’s theory of legitimacy through adopting the strong version of the
substantive requirement, many more of the extant laws would be illegitimate. If
these laws are illegitimate, then the state is not justified in enforcing these laws.
Without being justified in enforcing many of the laws, the state may not be
justified in enforcing enough of the laws to maintain social stability (even if the
state in fact maintains stability unjustifiably anyway). Thus, the worry is that
strengthening Rawls’s theory of legitimacy may make the theory unable to justify
what it set out to justify. Related to this worry is a concern that the strong version
would not promote respect for political authority and would undermine the duty to
obey the law. Both of these possible implications could also threaten social
stability.
The objector launching this worry could take it in at least two different
directions. One direction is to reject the strong version of the substantive
requirement, maintaining Rawls’s theory of legitimacy as it stands. To take this
direction, the objector would have to reject my arguments above affirming that
Rawls’s (moderate) version of the substantive requirement is sufficient to justify
state coercion to maintain stability. The other direction is that the objector could
be persuaded by my arguments above that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is not
strong enough. The objector could then either reject Rawls’s theory of legitimacy
altogether or propose an alternative way to strengthen the theory different from
adopting the strong version of the substantive requirement. Having identified the
diverging directions the objector could go, I will not explore them. Instead, I aim
to cut off both options by showing that the stability worry has little force.
To disable the stability worry I will use the same argumentative approach
that I employed above. I hope to supply many reasons on the side of why the
stability concern has little force outweighing the reasons for the contrary claim.
The first reason I offer is that even if a law is illegitimate such that the
state is not justified in enforcing the laws does not mean that individuals are
justified in violating the law. Individuals may still have moral obligations to obey
a law even if the state is not justified in enforcing the law. Thus, I am pointing out
that the objectives that Rawls wants to obtain with his theory of legitimacy are
separable. Rawls is correct to think that if a law is legitimate, an individual has a
duty to obey that law. However, just because a law is illegitimate, it does not
mean that an individual has no duty to obey the law. All it means is that the
individual has no duty—derived from the legitimacy of the law—to obey the law.
The individual’s duty to obey the law despite its illegitimacy may derive from
another moral source.
The moral sources for such duties are plentiful. The most relevant reason
to this discussion is that individuals may have a duty to obey the illegitimate law
to maintain the stability of the society. If so, then an individual’s obligation to
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obey illegitimate laws would depend on how their violation of the law would
affect the stability of the society.
Consider an example. Suppose Framed is imprisoned because he was
convicted of a law that he did not commit and the law Framed supposedly
violated was illegitimate such as drug trafficking. Despite the injustice in
Framed’s wrongful conviction and the illegitimacy of the liberty coercion in the
law itself and its use of imprisonment, Framed’s friend, Vigilante, may not be
justified in breaking Framed out of prison. The possible reasons are many. Such a
prison break may cause a credible threat to social stability. Such a prison break
may require violence against innocents morally prohibiting it.
Alternatively, if Framed could escape from prison without violence or
much fanfare, Framed would be committing no injustice because on multiple
fronts the enforcement of the imprisonment was unjustified. Vigilante would not
be committing injustice if she assisted Framed in such an escape for the same
reasons; it is a move toward justice without countervailing moral considerations.
The point is that an individual may avoid an illegitimate use of state coercion,
even by breaking other laws such as those against prison escapes, if no other
moral considerations (such as the risk of social stability or violence) forbid
avoiding the illegitimate coercion.
I will point out below that often no direct correlation exists between
violating a law and social stability. For now, assuming that a violation of a law
would lead to social instability, individuals may be morally obligated to obey
even illegitimate laws to maintain social stability. Thus, making more stringent
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy need not lead to instability. Even if making more
stringent Rawls’s theory demonstrates that in fact more laws than we thought
were illegitimate, individuals are not justified in violating these illegitimate laws
at will. Instead, they may still be obligated to obey illegitimate laws to maintain
social stability, although it is unlikely that violating many of the self-regarding
laws at issue here would threaten social stability. All that failing to meet the
strong version of theory legitimacy may mean is that the state is not justified in
enforcing the illegitimate laws.164
While the obligation to obey illegitimate laws is still injustice (in some
sense) to those who would rather not comply with the law, this injustice is
outweighed by the greater injustice that would occur from social instability. In
this situation, we are choosing the lesser of two injustices. Doing so is not
surprising in non-ideal theory; obeying illegitimate laws at times can be the
burden of social life. Such burdens must be born if the alternative is a greater
injustice.
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Just because individuals may be obligated to obey illegitimate laws for the
sake of stability does not leave these individuals powerless victims of injustice.
These individuals can use various mechanisms to redress their grievances with the
aim of getting the illegitimate laws changed and illegitimate punishments
overturned. Using the political process to redress their grievances about
illegitimate laws can maintain stability because it validates the political system in
place. Stability can also be maintained because the discontent individuals comply
with illegitimate laws while they are making their case to the public and the
government that the illegitimate laws should be changed.
The next reason why the stability objection has little force is that the legal
system has mechanisms that could be employed to accommodate the violation of
illegitimate laws without leading to instability. Two mechanisms are prominent:
legal justification and judicial review. A legal justification is an affirmative
defense where the defendant argues that even though she did the crime, she
should not “do the time;” she was justified in they way she acted. The most well
known of such defenses is the justification for killing in self-defense.
One way to implement this legal mechanism would be to have a generic
justification for self-regarding conduct. The justification would be: even though
the person committed the crime, the person was justified in doing so because the
conduct was self-regarding without even minimal risk of indirect effects on
others. So, regardless of what is criminalized, if the defendant proves she never
risked (even minimally) harm to others, then she would be acquitted of the crime
due to this self-regarding justification.
This particular justification does not exist in the extant legal system. My
point is that justifications to crimes do exist in the extant legal system. So, using
the mechanism of justification to allow individuals to combat illegitimate laws
such as those that criminalize self-regarding conduct, the legal system itself can
evaluate individual violations of the law to see if enforcing the law is justified.
Using the legal system to evaluate individual violations of illegitimate laws
reinforces the legal system leading to stability rather than instability.
Judicial review is another legal mechanism that could be used to deal with
illegitimate laws while affirming the legal system’s stability. Currently, judicial
review is used to invalidate laws that conflict with state constitutions or the
United States Constitution. Judicial review could be expanded to include the
power of the courts to invalidate illegitimate laws. Judges could invalidate laws if
the laws are not supported by any public reason, if the democratic process was not
adequate, or if the laws are not almost-just. As with legal justifications, using
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judicial review to deal with violations of the purported illegitimate laws would
generally reinforce the legal system as a whole rather than lead to its instability.165
Even though legal justifications and judicial review exist in the status quo,
to apply them to deal with illegitimate laws would require modifications to the
extant legal system possibly even constitutional amendments. With such
modifications, using legal justifications and judicial review as a check on
illegitimate laws would counteract destabilizing effects of the strong version. My
point is that these modifications would reinforce the legal system by allowing
these mechanisms to protect individuals against illegitimate laws. With these
modifications, the strong version would not threaten social stability. Additionally,
since Rawls’s own theory of legitimacy would invalidate some of the extant laws,
even his theory would benefit from these mechanisms to deal with illegitimate
laws in order to promote stability.
Another reason that a more stringent theory of legitimacy may not lead to
instability is that individuals may be justified in using certain forms of civil
disobedience to protest illegitimate laws. While in some cases, as I argued above,
individuals may be obligated to obey illegitimate laws for the sake of stability or
other moral reasons, such an obligation may not always hold or may have
exceptions. The exception may be that individuals may disobey illegitimate laws
through public civil disobedience.
Public civil disobedience involves violating laws, but it does so in a way
that tries to convince the public and the government that the law is unjust. While
civil disobedience can lead to social discord, civil disobedience also can reinforce
the legal system. The message of civil disobedience is not that we should revolt
and overthrow the government. Rather, the civilly disobedient can send the
message: the legal system is worth preserving except for this one illegitimate
aspect. The civilly disobedient can actually express their confidence in the justice
in general in the legal system by doing their disobedience publicly. The civilly
disobedient rely on the justice of their cause and society’s general commitment to
justice to persuade the government and the public that the laws should be
changed.
In Rawls’s early work, he advocated civil disobedience as a justified
mechanism to deal with state infringements on basic liberties.166 If we extend this
idea to his theory of legitimacy, we have another mechanism to deal with the
165

Rawls did not think that judicial review should be used to enforce some aspects of his theory
of justice such as the difference principle because he thought that such issues would be too
complex for the judiciary. FREEMAN, RAWLS, supra note 42, at 235. I doubt these concerns
because courts frequently deal with complex economic issues especially in anti-trust cases.
Nevertheless, applying judicial review to non-economic, self-regarding laws would not be
problematic because the judiciary has extensive experience evaluating such issues.
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RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION, supra note 97, at 371-72.
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stability concern. With the proper use of public civil disobedience, individuals can
exercise their freedom to do what the illegitimate law forbids while at the same
time garnering support for changing the illegitimate law. Since the illegitimate
law is violated in a public manner, history suggests social stability is not likely to
be highly threatened. Instead, the issue is thrust into the public square for
reconsideration. The political process is affirmed by giving it another chance to
assess the legitimacy of the law being publicly and civilly disobeyed.
So far, in this section, I have been granting that disobeying the law in
general and disobeying illegitimate laws in particular can lead to social instability.
Obviously, in some cases this claim is true. Mounting a powerful revolution,
committing a significant form of treason, and instigating widespread violent riots
are legal violations that can lead to instability. If the state were not justified in
using coercion to quash these activities and penalize them, then state coercion to
maintain stability would be hampered. Note that even the strong version of the
theory of legitimacy does allow the state to use liberty coercion (properly
proportioned) to enforce these laws. I now want to suggest that aside from these
obvious cases of violations of the law that lead to instability, other legal violations
usually are not directly correlated to social instability.
The first point to make is that most if not all societies with a legal system
are able to maintain stability despite some level of law breaking. Societies do not
even need to catch and penalize all law-breakers in order to maintain stability,
even though the populace may have to feel that the state is acceptably effective at
catching and penalize some of the law-breakers. How much law breaking a
society can tolerate and how effective in the eyes of the populace the state needs
to be at combating crime in order to maintain stability will vary among societies
and over time. Let me refer to both of these aspects as the society’s “crime
threshold.” As long as a society is at or below its crime threshold, the society will
not be come unstable through crime (though it could become unstable through
other means such as external attack). This point assumes that the inherently
destabilizing crimes (revolution, treason, and riots) are not part of the law
breaking that is taking place below the crime threshold.
The point about the crime threshold suggests that the strong version of the
theory of legitimacy need not lead to instability. As long as the crime—resulting
from public awareness that more laws (than they previously thought) are
illegitimate—does not push the society over its crime threshold, increased crime
will not make the society unstable. Before the worry about instability can get off
the ground, the objector would have to show that the strong version of the theory
of legitimacy would lead to crime that would cause the society to exceed its crime
threshold.
The objector may think that the crime threshold point does not adequately
address her concern. The objector’s concern is that with the more stringent theory
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of legitimacy, state coercion cannot justifiably maintain stability by enforcing the
laws if the state needs to do so. The last if-clause is key. The crime threshold
point may indicate that the state coercion may not be needed most of the time, but
if state coercion is needed to maintain stability, the strong version of the theory of
legitimacy indicates that such state coercion is not justifiable. Consequently, the
strong theory of legitimacy fails to justify state coercion to enforce the laws if
such is needed for stability, or so an objector may contend.
In response, I do not mean the crime threshold point to demonstrate that
the strong version of the theory of legitimacy will always justify state coercion to
maintain stability if needed. If all of a state’s laws are illegitimate, then the state
may not be justified in enforcing its laws to maintain stability (though I think
other issues not addressed here would need to be examined such as how likely
would a more just society replace the increasingly unstable one). The same point
would be true if all of the laws of a state were illegitimate according to Rawls’s
theory of legitimacy. However, the crime threshold point makes it plausible that
the strong version of the theory of legitimacy would not nullify the justifiability of
state coercion enough to make instability a significant worry. Let me explain.
As I argued above, the strong version of the theory of legitimacy indicates
that state coercion cannot justifiably enforce more extant laws than Rawls’s
theory of legitimacy indicates. I will refer to the laws that are justified by Rawls’s
theory of legitimacy but would be invalidated by the strong version the
“problematic laws.” The stability concern would only have force if the law
breaking that threatens the stability of a society resulted from the “problematic
laws.” As long as the stability was not threatened by the violation of the
“problematic laws,” then the state would be as justified in using coercion to
maintain stability under the strong version of theory of legitimacy as it would be
under Rawls’s version.
Additionally, as long as the populace did not highly value the problematic
laws, it is unlikely that upon learning that the laws are illegitimate large amounts
of people would lose their respect for political authority in general and abandon
their duty to obey legitimate laws. Most individuals can understand that a system
that is not perfect can still be worth maintaining in part so that it can be
improved.167
Furthermore, it is unlikely that violation of the “problematic laws” would
need to be enforced in order to maintain stability. First of all, the main
“problematic laws” in the United States that I have identified are already
frequently flouted. The laws prohibiting self-regarding conduct (drugs,
prostitution, and gambling) are widely flouted in the status quo without the
stability of the society threatened.
167

Rawls makes a similar point in RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 97, at 393.
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In fact, the opposite may occur. If the state were able to figure a way to
enforce most violations of the laws concerning self-regarding conduct, the
enforcement of such widely sought after conduct may cause instability due to its
oppressive effect.
Not only is it likely that widespread enforcement of frequently flouted
illegitimate laws could lead to instability, but it is also likely that even less
enforcement of these illegitimate laws could better maintain stability. Less
enforcement of the illegitimate laws would maintain stability for two reasons.
First, those who flout these laws do not think they are legitimate. By
letting these people do as they please without state intervention, these individuals
may have less reason to be angry with the government and cause other
destabilizing problems. They may prefer that the illegitimate laws were rectified,
but an unenforced illegitimate law has little real impact on the individuals who
disagree with and violate the unenforced law. The examples I have in mind are
possession of small amounts of drugs (indicating they are for use rather than for
sale), prostitution between independent (no pimp), consenting adults, and
individuals gambling in their residences. If the state were not to pursue people
engaged in such conduct, these people are less likely to be angry at the state and
do other activities that are disruptive of social stability such as breaking other
legitimate laws.168 Non-enforcement of these laws would actually make these
people have more respect for political authority and more likely to fulfill their
duty to obey legitimate laws.
The second reason why less enforcement of illegitimate laws can help
maintain stability is that enforcing the law is expensive. Providing police, courts,
lawyers, juries, municipal buildings, prisons, prison guards, subsistence to
prisoners, and the supportive staff for each of these functions can take many
resources. The “war on drugs” in particular has been vastly expensive.169 Despite
the vast expense, drugs in general have become cheaper and more readily
available on the streets.170 In short, the vastly expensive war on drugs has failed
on many fronts. Instead of spending so many resources enforcing illegitimate
laws, these resources could be reallocated to apprehending violators of core
criminal offenses (murder, theft, rape). Better enforcement of the core of the
criminal law instead of the illegitimate self-regarding laws would likely yield
much greater returns on social stability.
168

Note a novel strategy where individuals accused of minor drug offenses are not prosecuted in
exchange for their DNA sample, hoping that knowing the police have their DNA discourages them
from committing worse crimes. Schott’s Vocab, Spit and Acquit, NEW YORK TIMES (April 16,
2009).
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I have offered two reasons why less enforcement of illegitimate laws
could yield greater stability: the state does not incite those who disagree with the
law to cause other destabilizing problems, and the state can reallocate resources to
enforcement of laws more vital to social stability. Thus, for many illegitimate
laws, the state does not need to be able to justifiably enforce the law to maintain
stability. Instead, the state merely needs to stop enforcing these illegitimate laws.
To that extent, the strong theory of legitimacy would not lead to instability
because the state can better maintain stability by not enforcing many illegitimate
laws than by enforcing them. The bonus of not enforcing illegitimate laws (in
addition to greater stability) is that not enforcing illegitimate laws means that the
legal system better approximates justice.
A point I mention in passing above should be emphasized regarding the
issue of stability. Many factors in addition to the society’s crime threshold
influence the stability of a society. I am not just referring to whether the society
faces external threats such as invasion. Less salient are the ways that citizens can
threaten social stability by performing certain activities or refraining from other
activities, all of which is legal.171 Widespread non-violent protests, boycotting
integral parts of the economy, or refraining from voting in large numbers could
lead to social instability. Also, the government failure to regulate the economy or
provide other public goods such as affordable health care could destabilize a
society.
The point here is not that Rawls’s theory of legitimacy needs to be
modified or augmented to deal with these other factors of social stability. Rather,
to maintain stability a state’s best options may not be enforcing illegitimate laws
but rather bolstering the economy and bestowing benefits on the citizenry. These
non-coercive elements may be able to maintain stability better than the state
rigorously enforcing all of the laws in the society. The essential idea is that
meeting people’s needs may produce greater social stability than punishing
violations of the law.
For these reasons, the strong theory of legitimacy does not pose a
significant threat to social stability. Just the opposite could be the case. By having
a more stringent standard for legitimacy, the criminal law could be reformed—
through the stability producing mechanisms or legal justifications and judicial
review as well as other democratic processes—such that greater justice is enjoyed.
Such a step toward greater justice would produce a better society, one worth
maintaining. As the society progresses towards justice by adopting the strong
theory of legitimacy, the society may be more stable because the citizens
appreciate the state’s efforts to protect important liberties by reforming the
criminal law.
171
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Conclusion: Points to Remember
I want to emphasize two things. First, although my primary examples of
extant laws that are illegitimate under the strong theory of legitimacy but
legitimate under Rawls’s theory are laws involving self-regarding conduct, such
should not be taken to mean that these laws are the only ones. There are laws
involving other-regarding conduct that would also be delegitimized by adopting
the strong version of the substantive requirement. Examples are trespassing laws,
laws against lightly touching another person in a non-taboo spot (now considered
battery), and property laws that give too much leniency to freeloaders. Also, while
some laws would still be legitimate under the strong theory of legitimacy, their
penalties may be illegitimate at least at the extreme ends of the possible sentences.
Space has prevented a fuller discussion of these other laws that would be
delegitimized under the strong theory of legitimacy. But, my not exploring them
should not be construed to imply that they do not exist.
The second thing worth emphasizing is that the laws prohibiting selfregarding conduct are not a trivial part of the criminal justice system. In fact, the
“war on drugs” has made drug law enforcement alone a significant part of the
criminal justice system. Nearly 20% of the people in prisons are non-violent
offenders of drug laws.172 Aside from the vast expense from the enforcement of
drug laws, we should also not forget the human suffering that has resulted—not
from the ingesting of drugs or what intoxicated people have done—but from the
enforcement of drug laws. Even vociferous supporters of drug laws admit that the
enforcement of drug laws causes much suffering and crime.173
Some commentators have projected that the enforcement of the drug laws
as they are currently done could lead to the collapse of the criminal justice
system.174 The criminal justice system cannot handle for much longer the number
of people currently prosecuted and imprisoned for drug crimes.175
Other laws involving self-regarding conduct are not causing as much
problems to the criminal justice system as the drug laws are. But, we should not
forget how many women engaged in prostitution must rely on pimps to avoid
being prosecuted, pimps who beat and rape these women continuously. Pimps
also take much of the money the women earn so that the pimps can keep the
women dependent on them.
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Due to these reasons, I focused on laws criminalizing self-regarding
conduct as those laws that would be delegitimized under the strong version of the
theory of legitimacy. Reforming these laws are not just about letting aging hippies
smoke doobies on the weekends. These laws involving self-regarding conduct
have created multiple social tragedies. The strong theory of legitimacy seeks to
make the state do better in its laws and use of coercion so that the state can stop
ruining so many people’s lives.
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